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ABSTRACT 
Political responses to terrorism in the United States and the international 
community have been to place limitations upon and/or to suspend civil liberties.  Since 
constraining civil liberties may lead to the spread of terror, balancing the competing 
interests of individual civil liberties and public safety/security measures imposed by 
government in times of national emergency is essential to reducing terrorism and to the 
pursuit of peace.  Constitutional courts both federal and state through the mechanism of 
judicial review serve to guard civil liberties against government encroachment.  Yet, 
some scholars decry judicial review as counter-majoritarian, an illegitimate and 
undemocratic exercise in a representative democracy, while others laud judicial review as 
an essential function to advance peace, public participation in governing and legitimating 
democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism. 
This thesis seeks to transcend the debate over judicial review by exploring the 
views of State Supreme Court Justices on what factors they consider essential to consider 
when balancing the competing interests.  It invites the reader to engage a global 
discourse.  To participate in the political spaces, judges operate to accept that because 
judicial review offers an alternative to the sword, it is material and relevant to reducing 
terrorism and that by focusing on the signals, the justices send the public might respond 
adequately to preserve human dignity during the global war on terror and beyond.  
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A. CONSTRAINING CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SPREAD OF TERROR 
A response to terrorism in the United States and internationally has been to place 
limitations upon and/or to suspend civil liberties,1 including banning engagement in 
political activity and/or limiting the right to privacy and/or limiting the right to due 
process before a judicial forum.2  Civil liberties in America refer to the expressed and 
implied protections afforded in her federal and state constitutions designed to maintain 
freedom from coercive governmental actions.3  Research shows that when a government 
constrains liberties by withdrawing or foreclosing individual rights, terrorism spreads:4  
—where the legitimate grievances of a people go un-redressed by the seat of power—





                                                 
1 Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on 
American Ideals (New York, NY: The Double Day Publishing Group, 2008), 199-200; Dalia Dassa Kaye, 
Federic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant, and Dale Stahl, “More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political 
Violence in the Arab World,” California: RAND Corporation, JQ1850.A91M67, 2008, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG772.pdf (accessed December 1, 2008), 79-80; 
100-102; 120-121; 141-142; 161. 
2 Ibid., Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op at 42-64, 553 U.S., 2008 WL 2369628 (June 12, 
2008) (plurality) (Detainee Treatment Act’s Combatant Status Review Tribunal procedure for challenging 
enemy combatant status inadequate substitute for habeas relief); Adeno Addis, “Symposium: Extraordinary 
Power in Ordinary Times ‘Informal’ Suspension of Normal Processes: The ‘War on Terror,” 87 Boston 
University Law Review, 323 (2007): 323-346; Harlan K. Ullman presentation on Algeria’s Struggle Against 
Terrorism presented at the Hearing before The Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation of the Committee On International Relations House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st 
sess., Serial No. 109-10, (March 3, 2006), 19-20. Ullman discusses the horrors associated with the Algerian 
government’s use of violence and sustained suppression of freedoms as a primary means to eradicate 
terrorism that resulted in the death or disappearance of several thousands of Algeria’s law-abiding citizens. 
3 Richard Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (England: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 4-5.  
4 Dalia Dassa Kaye, Federic Wehrey, Audra K. Grant and Dale Stahl, “More Freedom, Less Terror? 
Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab World,” 167-169; Dennis Pluchinsky, “Ethnic Terrorism: 
Themes and Variations,” in The Unconventional Threat to Homeland Security, Center for Homeland 
Defense and Security (Fall 2007), 36-37. 
5 Ibid. 
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imposing public safety and security measures (governmental acts designed to secure a 
sovereign against real and/or imagined threats),6 which unduly burden liberties7 or 
governmental acts that fail to recognize individual liberties for all equally.8   
Since constraining liberties can lead to increased terrorism, it is imperative to the 
pursuit of peace that the competing interests of the right to privacy be free from 
unreasonable search and seizures, petition the courts, and counsel be appropriately 
balanced with public safety and security measures implemented via national security or 
homeland defense/security laws,9 and strategies or policies.10  Specifically, it means 
those laws, strategies and policies requiring state participation within the federal  
 
 
                                                 
6 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, 4-5.  
7 See line of enemy combatant cases: Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.2d 42, 49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 
(2004); Padilla, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005); Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
294 F.3d 598 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 
F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); al-Marri v. Wright, 443 F. Supp. 2d 
774 (D.S.C. 2006); al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007), rehearing en banc granted (August 22, 
2007); al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, No. 06-7427, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 2736787 (4th Cir. July 15, 2008) (en 
banc); see also, Pluchinsky, “Ethnic Terrorism: Themes and Variations,” 36-37; Seth Jones and Martin 
Libicki, “How Terrorism Ends: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda” Santa Monica, California: RAND 
Corporation, HV6431.j65, 2008, 17, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG741/ (accessed August 12, 
2008). 
8 Moghaddam explains that Islamic fundamentalists oppose equality for women and democratic 
decision making for everyone. Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they 
Experience and Why they Come to Destroy (Praeger Security International, Westport: Connecticut, 2006), 
68.  
9 See, e.g., United and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
And Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Public Law 107-56; 107th Congress; Authorization to Use 
Military Force (AUMF), Public Law 107-40, U.S. Statutes at Large 115 (2001); Authorization for the Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq (Washington, DC: Whitehouse, October, 2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021002-2.html (accessed April 16, 2008); On July 
31, 2008, President Bush amended executive order codifying the importance of Federal intelligence 
community collaboration with state, local and tribal intelligence communities and with the private sector 
“when undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect the United 
States.” The full text of the executive order can be viewed at: U.S. Intelligence Activities Executive Order 
12333 as amended by EO 13284 (2003) EO 13355 (2004), 13470 (2008), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080731-2.html (accessed January 27, 2009); “U.S. 
May Ease Police Spy Rules: More Federal Intelligence Changes Planned,” Washington Post, August 16, 
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/15/AR2008081503497.html? 
nav=emailpage (accessed August 17, 2008). 
10 Ibid., The National Strategy for Information Sharing (Washington, DC: White House, October 
2007). http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html (accessed December 22, 2007).  
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information-sharing environments where detention, interrogation, and surveillance 
programs are challenged11 and where laws, policies, or programs impede access to a 
judicial forum of competent jurisdiction.12   
The federal judiciary plays a key role in mitigating the spread of terror.13  As 
independent guardians of civil liberties and of the principles of separation of powers,14 
that is, principles of shared governing among the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches to provide checks and balances on governmental power,15 the federal judiciary 
is chiefly responsible for balancing the competing interests of civil liberties and public 






                                                 
11 Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American 
Ideals, 102-103 writes how extraordinary rendition “a means of extraditing criminal suspects from one 
foreign country to another outside of the recognized legal process” was used to advance torture of terror 
suspects; Law Professors’ Petition to Congress American Bar Association House Resolution 302 
http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/aba_house302-0206.pdf (accessed February 1, 2008); James Risen 
and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts,” New York Times, December 16, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?_r=1&scp=8&sq=secret%20 
surveillance&st=cse&oref=slogin (accessed May 12, 2007). 
12 Ibid., see also, line of enemy combatant case supra at fn 7. 
13 Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op at 34-36; Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 536. 
14 Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. at 536 (plurality) (“Whatever power 
the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with 
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when 
individual liberties are at stake” quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (it was “the 
central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of 
governmental power into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”); see also 
Keith E. Whittington, ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand:” Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial 
Review by the United States Supreme Court,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 4 (November 
2005): 587, http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/APSRNov05Whittington.pdf (accessed August 18, 2008).  
15 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, no. 74 (New York: 
Penguin, 1987), 440-442. 
16 Federal jurisdiction flows from Article III of the U.S. Constitution vesting the Federal court system 
with full judicial power--that is final decision-making authority over certain causes of actions including all 
habeas corpus petitions made pursuant to the United States Constitution. Author unknown, “Comparing 
Federal and State Court Systems,” http://www.uscourts.gov/outreach/resources/comparefedState.html 
(accessed December 20, 2007).  
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judiciary would not have final decision-making authority over decisions made pursuant to 
the Federal Constitution,17 since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, their views on 
balancing the competing interests are especially relevant.   
Consider Executive Order 1233318 and the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing designed to enhance intelligence information sharing among the state, local tribal 
and private sector with that of the federal intelligence community.19  Homeland defense 
and security (HLDS) professionals agree, implementation of the strategy requires 
drawing heavily from the resources of state and local law enforcement.20  An avenue to 
state court jurisdiction may open, where shared intelligence leads to a state request for 
preventative detention or the issuance of a gubernatorial executive order to detain terror 
suspects.   
B. IMPERATIVES OF STATE JUDICIAL VIEWS ON BALANCING THE 
COMPETING INTERESTS 
This thesis will not examine the basis on which a state supreme court would 
exercise jurisdiction over a terrorism case; it assumes that state and local law 
                                                 
17 Ibid., See Michigan Department of Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 448-455 (1990) where the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that state police random sobriety checkpoints did not violate the federal constitution’s 
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures. By contrast, the Michigan State Supreme Court in 
construing that state’s constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures under Article I, 
Section 11 determined the state’s sobriety checkpoints violated the prohibition against unreasonable search 
and seizures. Ascher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186-187 (Minn. 1994) (“[d]eclining to 
follow Sitz, we reaffirmed on the basis of our state constitution the long-standing requirement in Minnesota 
that police need an objective individualized articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing before making an 
investigative stop.”) 
18 U.S. Presidential “Executive Order: Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States 
Intelligence Activities,” July 31, 2008 Section 2 Part 1.1(f)state, local, and tribal governments are critical 
partners in securing and defending the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United States 
and its interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into account the responsibilities and 
requirements of state, local, and tribal governments and, as appropriate, private sector entities, when 
undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to protect the United States. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080731-2.html (accessed August 12, 2008). 
19 The National Strategy for Information Sharing at 11, 17-20, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf (accessed August 8, 2008). 
20 Jones and Libicki, “How Terrorism Ends: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda,” 18-19, 27-30; 
William Forsyth, State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative Approach in Modeling a 
State Fusion Center (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2005), 5-6, 
62; Christopher J. Cleary, Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, Analysis, 
and Dissemination of Terrorist Information (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
March 2006), 12. 
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enforcement and intelligence actions taken consistent with the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing and pursuant to applicable law would serve as the basis for such 
jurisdiction.  The research aims are to ascertain through qualitative research methodology 
those factors State Supreme Court justices (State Supreme Court Justices or the 
Supremes) view as essential in determining the appropriateness of suspending or limiting 
civil liberties during national emergencies and how those factors should be balanced and 
why.  In addition, they identify judicial views on whether it is ever appropriate to suspend 
or limit civil liberties in an effort to defeat terrorism, and if yes, to what degree, under 
what circumstances and for how long.   
Identifying factors State Supreme Court justices view as essential to balancing the 
competing interests appropriately are of special importance because geopolitically21 State 
Supreme Court justices are proximate to the locus of HLDS state and local law 
enforcement and intelligence activities that might give rise to a cause of action.  Judicial 
proximity to the locus of HLDS activities provides an opportunity for judicial oversight, 
informed by the unique character of each individual state, its residents including U.S. 
citizens, and non-U.S. citizens:  U.S. nationals, legal permanent residents and aliens, over 
governmental action.  Further, because State Supreme Court justices in construing a State 
Constitution may apply heightened protection of civil liberties,22 proximity matters. 
However, some scholars challenge the notion that constitutional courts are 
relevant in or to American democracy,23 particularly decisions relating to war.24  They do 
not agree judges are equipped to “produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape 
                                                 
21 Geopolitical refers to a combination of political and geographic factors relating to something (as a 
State or particular resources). See Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/geopolitics (accessed August 18, 2008). 
22 In interpreting a state constitution, the state court can establish a “higher’ ceiling of rights for 
individuals than a federal court would provide in interpreting the federal constitution. Michigan 
Department of Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 1990; Sitz v. Michigan Department of Police, 193 Mich. App. 
690 (1993).  
23 Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” 1348-1353, 1363. 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2008/05/Waldron.pdf (accessed August 5, 2008); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 154. 
24 John C. Yoo, “Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism,” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=461721b (accessed August 7, 2008), (“unlike the 
legislative process, there is no clear, precise procedure that governs decisions on war”), 5. 
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and guide”25 the behavior of the public and private sector to promote public value:  
enhance life liberty and the pursuit of happiness for all while fostering a more perfect 
union,26 with a steady, respected and friendly hand.27  The results of this research of 
judicial views on balancing competing interests during the global war on terror 
(GWOT)28 and beyond seeks to inform core theoretical concepts challenging state 
judicial governance29 and to highlight the Supremes’ views and judicial review’s material 
relevance30 to democracy’s quest to reduce and defeat terrorism.  
C. OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
The research will highlight the important strategic function state judicial review 
can play in coordinating public and private efforts to reduce the spread of terror.  
Moreover, the research will serve as a new source from which the academic, legal, and 
political domains may transcend traditional debates regarding the applicability of the 
historical framework that characterizes the art of government,31 to state judicial review 
during the GWOT, namely theoretical arguments against judicial review. 
                                                 
25 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 3rd edition (San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass, 
2004), 6; see also, Annie Pye, “Leadership and Organizing Sensemaking in Action,” Leadership 1, no. 1 
(2005): 32. 
26 Sharing the benefits of strategic planning, Bryson invokes the Constitution “In the United States, 
creating public value means enhancing life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all while fostering a 
more perfect union.” Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to 
Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational Achievement, 8. 
27 Keith E. Whittington, ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand:” Political Supports for the Exercise of 
Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court,” 586. 
28 In response to the 9/11 attacks, President Bush signaled a national emergency uttering the words 
“We’re at war,” characterized it as global in nature, and resolved to continue it “until every terrorist group 
of global reach has been found stopped, and defeated.” George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to a 
Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Washington, DC: White House, September 2001), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (accessed March 20, 2008). 
29 For purposes of this thesis, judicial governance means the theoretical activity of judicial review, 
which is a constitutional court’s power to annul legislative or executive actions deemed to violate the 
Constitution. 
30 For purposes of this thesis, material means pertinent and necessary and relevance means germane. 
31 The art of government refers to the interplay of sovereignty, the supremacy of laws, and public 
participation in the disposition of goods and services for the common good of the people.  
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Chapter II sets out the qualitative research methodology and the grounded theory 
approach chosen by the researcher to guide the researcher through data gathering and 
analysis.   
Chapter III provides an overview of literature on theories of judicial review and 
non-judicial review, and on the material relevance of judicial review as a strategic 
mechanism for coordinating public participation in the political spaces judges operate 
when balancing competing interest during the GWOT and further.   
Chapter IV documents justification for interviewing Chief Justice Joseph R. 
Weisberger (Ret.) of the Rhode Island Supreme Court.  It also invites the reader to 
participate in a series of three (3) interviews conducted with the Chief Justice.  During the 
interviews, the Chief Justice reveals his views on, inter alia, the strategic function state 
judicial review can have in democracy’s quest to reduce the spread of terror and he 
validates key factors necessary to balancing the competing interests during the GWOT 
that were identified from a survey (copy attached) submitted to 55 State Supreme Court 
justices.   
Chapter V provides concluding thoughts on judicial review as a mechanism for 
leading public participation in the complex world of HLDS32 as well as implications for 
future research. 
                                                 
32 For a comprehensive discussion on leading in the complex world of homeland defense and security, 
see Nola Joyce, Can You Lead Me Now? Leading in the Complex World of Homeland Security (Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, September 2007). 
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II. METHODOLOGY FOR DISCOVERING JUDICIAL VIEWS  
To answer the research problem of discovering the views of the State Supreme 
Court on balancing competing interests, the researcher invited 55 State Supreme Court 
justices, including Chief Justice Weisberger, to complete, voluntarily, a confidential 
survey.33  The research aims to identify through qualitative research methodology, factors 
considered essential to balance when determining the appropriateness of suspending or 
limiting civil liberties during national emergencies and how those factors should be 
balanced and why.  In addition, the research aims to identify judicial views on whether it 
is ever appropriate to suspend or limit civil liberties in an effort to reduce/defeat terrorism 
and if yes, to what degree, under what circumstances and for how long.  Also, as 
importantly, the research seeks to inform core theoretical concepts for and against 
judicial review and to highlight the imperatives of state judicial review as a legitimate 
strategy for coordinating public participation in the political spaces judges operate when 
interpreting/creating constitutional law, and to public value, as well as to democracy’s 
quest to reduce terrorism.   
A. QUALITATIVE METHOD 
Gail Fann Thomas explains in her lecture Research Methods:  Qualitative Data 
Analysis the benefits of qualitative research methodologies, benefits that permit the 
researcher to study more deeply human behavior, and the political world by 1) observing 
actual behavior and/or 2) by questioning informants.  The researcher selected the survey 
as the tool for exploring judicial views in their political world because of the 
impediments to the actual observation or interviewing of 55 justices.  Data gathering via 
the survey has had the greatest potential for researcher access to the story of a multitude 
of justices.  Moreover, in-person interviewing of Chief Justice Weisberger as well as the 
researcher’s previous observations, having served as a law clerk to the Chief Justice from 
1997-1999, satisfies the dual reach of qualitative research:  actual observation and 
                                                 
33 Sources for the survey questions include certain opinions of the United States Supreme Court and 
Posner’s, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency.  
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questioning for data gathering purposes.  The survey and the series of interviews 
provided the researcher with the opportunity to employ analytic strategies associated with 
the grounded theory approach said to benefit Mode 2 research, which is concerned with 
diminishing the space between academia and practice domains.34  In this thesis, the 
researcher explores diminishing the space between theoretical notions of judicial review 
on balancing competing interests and the practice domain of judicial review on balancing 
competing interests for purposes of coordinating public participation in the political 
spaces judges operate when interpreting/creating constitutional law, advancing public 
value, and legitimating democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism. 
B. GROUNDED THEORY APPROACH 
The grounded theory approach falls under the umbrella of qualitative research and 
is a complex iterative process used to develop theory about issues of interest to 
researchers that also has practical usefulness to society.35  As an initial step in the 
grounded theory approach, the researcher typically generates questions related to the 
issues of interests to guide data gathering.  In this instance, researcher developed 30 
questions for submission via a survey to 55 State Supreme Court justices.  The questions 
informed but did not serve solely as the interview questions asked of the Chief Justice.   
While reviewing the data gathered, from the survey and the interviews, the 
researcher employed key analytic strategies first to identify common core theoretical 
concepts and categories, and second, to identify conceptual links among survey and 





                                                 
34 Karen Locke, Grounded Theory in Management Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2001), 170.  
35 Ibid., Gail Fain, “Research Methods Knowledge Base: Qualitative Approaches,” 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/qualapp.php (accessed May 8, 2008). 
36 Locke, Grounded Theory in Management Research, 170; Fain, “Research Methods Knowledge 
Base: Qualitative Approaches.” 
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Coding: categorizing and describing details about the data gathered 
Memoing: memorializing in writing researcher thoughts and ideas 
generated as part of the data review for additional analysis 
Diagramming developing graphs, charts maps for data sense-making of 
emerging theoretical concepts 
To test the adequacy of the theoretical concepts and categories identified through 
the interviews and survey data and the concept of judicial review as a strategic function 
for coordinating public participation in the political spaces judges operate when 
interpreting/creating constitutional law, for advancing public value and for legitimating 
democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism, the researcher utilized three (3) principles.  First, 
theoretical sampling, the researcher selected data sources that provided information 
relevant to existing theoretical concepts and categories at issue when balancing the 
competing interests especially, but not exclusively during national emergencies and 
concepts at issue concerning judicial review’s material relevancy to reducing terrorism in 
a democracy.  Second, triangulation requiring the assessment of different sources of data 
collected.  After transcribing and coding the interviews, the researcher expanded or 
contracted the concepts or categories identified by comparing them with those identified 
from the coded survey results.  This process permitted the researcher to test not only the 
adequacy of survey and interview identified theoretical concepts or categories, but the 
researcher’s understanding of them as well.  Next, the researcher compared identified 
categories and concepts with the literature review, and developed three hypotheses to 
guide the reader’s participation in the interviews, as well as the researcher’s analysis of 
the data, and concluding thoughts.  Lastly, having reached the third principle, theoretical 
saturation—diminished returns on finding new data, the researcher offers implications for 
further research.  This iterative process informs core theoretical concepts for and against 
judicial review and highlights the imperatives of state judicial review as legitimate 
strategy to coordinate public participation, advance public value and for democratic 
leading during the GWOT and beyond. 
 12
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III. REVIEWING THE LITERATURE 
A. THE GWOT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial balancing of competing interests during the GWOT has proven 
particularly challenging.  One clear objective of terrorists is to shake the American 
psyche, to cause a paralyzing fear through sustained threats of violence and acts of 
violence37 that fuels a collective belief that when it comes to securing personal and 
community safety, the American system of government is wounded, diseased, impotent; 
utterly incapable of doing anything to protect the citizenry.38  Indeed, in such a diseased 
state of being, the political branches of government have operated from a center of fear 
and panic,39 seeking to cure itself through rearrangement; the political branches nearly 
embraced authoritarianism by restricting judicial power to review legislative and 
executive actions for constitutional sufficiency, even where the cures denied liberty.40   
Consider the creation of Combatant Status Review Tribunals, a three-panel board 
of military officers from the Department of Defense, as opposed to the judiciary, were 
authorized to decide the status of persons detained as terror suspects.  The detainees were 
denied habeas corpus, denied access to counsel, and denied access to classified evidence, 
and with that, an opportunity to mount a reasonable defense.41  In addition, the 
government enjoyed a rebuttable presumption in its favor.  These experimental 
                                                 
37 Bruce Bongar, “The Psychology of Terrorism: Defining the Need and Describing the Goals,” in 
Psychology of Terrorism, ed. Bruce Bongar, Lisa M. Brown, Larry E. Beutler, James N. Breckenridge, and 
Philip G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4-6. 
38 Addis, “Symposium: Extraordinary Powers in Ordinary Times ‘Informal’ Suspension of Normal 
Processes,” 323-346. Addis argues that America’s failure to balance adequately competing interests in her 
efforts to defeat terror is akin to an auto-immunity disease “a medical condition that emerges when an 
organism compromises its own integrity by perceiving a part of itself as being foreign and attacking it to 
eliminate it:” Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, “America and the World,” moderated by David 
Ignatius, (New York: Basic Books, 2008) (“9/11 is not only a tactical success for Osama but a self-inflicted 
strategic wound for the United States”), 21. 
39 Addis, “Symposium: Extraordinary Powers in Ordinary Times ‘Informal’ Suspension of Normal 
Processes,” 323-346; Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War 
on American Ideals, 1-10; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Terrorized by ‘War on Terror:’ How a Three-Word 
Mantra Has Undermined America,” Washington Post Op-Ed, March 25, 2007. 
40 Ibid., see also line of enemy combatant cases supra fn 7.  
41 Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1195, slip op at 42-64. 
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constraints upon liberty arose in direct response to the horrific terrorist attacks of 9/11, 
and included secret surveillance,42 prolonged detainment at military installations43 
interrogation and torture of terror suspects44 and continued until judicial review checked 
those constraints that failed to abide by the limitations imposed by the Constitution under 
the principles of separation of powers.   
The Founders of the American republic proclaimed separation of powers as 
essential, and with that, the necessity of judicial review as a guide to ensure the 
appropriate balancing of competing interests.  Hamilton in the Federalist Papers No. 78 
argued that review performed by an independent judiciary is a necessary power to endow 
the judiciary with in order to secure the Union, preserve peace, and to protect the interests 
of the people from an overreaching government.45  Irrespective of historic sanctioning, 
critics of judicial review accost it as unauthorized, unnecessary and undemocratic.   
                                                 
42 For discussions addressing concerns over electronic surveillance activity see the American Bar 
Association House Resolution 302, http://www.abanet.org/op/greco/memos/aba_house302-0206.pdf 
(accessed February 1, 2008); Elizabeth B. Bazan, Gina Marie Stevens, Brain T Yeh ,CRS Report RL 
33424, Government Access to Phone Calling Activity and Related Records: Legal Authorities (2007) 
Elizabeth B. Bazan, CRS, Report RL 34279, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: A Brief Overview 
of Selected Issues (2007).  
43 In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 552 (2004) the U.S. Government challenged the jurisdiction of the 
federal court to hear habeas petitions of detainees arguing the detainees were not citizens of the United 
States and they were detained outside the territory of the United States at Guantanamo Bay. The court 
rejected the government’s argument reasoning that the detainees: “are not nationals of countries at war with 
the United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression against the United 
States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with or convicted of 
wrongdoing; and for more than two years, they have been imprisoned in territory over which the United 
States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.”  
44 Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into a War on American 
Ideals, 140-181. 
45 Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, “Federalist Papers,” 440-442. 
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B. THE CASE AGAINST JUDICIAL REVIEW  
Theorists Jeremy Waldron and Mark Tushnet contend that judicial review is 
unnecessary,46 at best and democratically illegitimate,47 at worst.  Resting on Alexander 
Bickel’s48 counter-majoritarian theory that judicial review permits unelected or otherwise 
unaccountable officials—judges, to “tell[] the people’s elected representative that they 
cannot govern as they like,”49 Waldron and Tushnet develop provocative arguments 
against judicial review as inveighing against popular constitutionalism.   
Popular Constitutionalism advances the idea that “we all ought to participate in 
creating Constitutional law through our actions in politics.”50  For Waldron, judicial 
review endangers popular constitutionalism because “. . . it disenfranchises ordinary 
citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equality in 
the final resolution of issues about rights.”51  Similarly, but refraining from going as far 
as Mary Becker’s52 charge that judicial review and the Constitution, itself, adversely 
                                                 
46 Mark V. Tushnet, Taking The Constitution Away From The Courts, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 154 (“[d]oing away with judicial review would have one clear effect [i]t would 
return all constitutional decision making to the people acting politically.”); Noting that United States 
senators may raise a constitutional point of order regarding any bill under consideration, Tushnet also 
challenges the idea that constitutional courts are the only body equipped to place constraints on political 
branches through review of legislation for constitutionality. Mark V. Tushnet, “Non-Judicial Review,” 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/jol/vol40_2/tushnet.pdf (accessed September 11, 2008), 454-
458. 
47 Jeremy Waldron, argues “judicial review of legislation is inappropriate as a mode of final decision 
making in a free and democratic society,” he admits, however, that where democratic and legislative 
institutions are not in “good shape so far as political equality is concerned,” the arguments against judicial 
review do not go through. “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” 1348-1353, 1401-1402. 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2008/05/Waldron.pdf (accessed August 5, 2008). 
48 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d 
edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 16-17. (“[J]udicial review is a counter-majoritarian 
force in our system. . . . [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act. . . .it thwarts 
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now. . . .”). 
49 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), 4. 
50 Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, 157.  
51 Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” 1353. 
52 See generally, Mary Becker, “The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights:” A 
Bicentennial Perspective,” 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453 (1992): 453-517; Mary Becker, “Towards a Progressive 
Politics and a Progressive Constitution,” 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2007 (2001): 2008-2056; Robin West, 
Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstruction the Fourteenth Amendment (Durham: Duke University, 
1994). 
 16
impacts the distribution of justice and social rights.53 Robin West has also called for 
limiting the reach of the judiciary, preferring that the political branches as opposed to 
constitutional courts vindicate commitments about rights.   
Erwin Chemerinsky, a supporter of judicial review, opines that for the popular 
constitutionalist, then, popular constitutionalism requires the elimination or scaling back 
of judicial review to demonstrate a “commitment to majoritarianism . . . . a deference to 
all elected officials at all levels of government” who are elected to represent the will of 
the people.54   
In short, popular constitutionalists appear to share Ran Hirschl’s view:  judicial 
review represents a constitutional experiment that has failed, that the activity of judicial 
review has created a Juristocracy due to the transfer of “an unprecedented amount of 
power from representative institutions to judiciaries.”55  If Hirschl is correct and the 
central function of popular constitutionalism is to preserve America’s representative 
democracy as Hirschl envisions the Framers of the Constitution intended, what is wrong, 
if anything, with eliminating judicial review? 
Undoubtedly, the central function of popular constitutionalism is democratic.  It 
champions sovereign rule through public participation in representative governing, 
through which the will of the public majority exists in laws that provide for the 
disposition of goods and services for the benefit of all.  However, the central function of 
popular constitutionalism is also its central problem.  Historically, in the United States, 
majority rule left unchecked by the essential purpose of judicial review, the annulment of  
 
 
                                                 
53 Becker, “The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights:” A Bicentennial Perspective;” 
Becker, “Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution;” West, Progressive 
Constitutionalism: Reconstruction the Fourteenth Amendment; Linda C. McClain and James E. Fleming, 
“Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and Progressive Change, (2005), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=672382 (accessed September 15, 2008), 19. 
54 Erwin Chemerinsky, “In Deference of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular Constitutionalism,” 
673 University of Illinois Law Review, 690 (2004): 677-679. 
55 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1.  
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legislative or executive actions deemed to violate the Constitution, resulted in tyranny of 
the majority.56  It shielded silence around state sanctioned systemic persecution of racial, 
ethnic, religious minorities and women.   
Chief Justice Taney’s Dred Scott decision is but one example.  The decision 
embraced popular constitutionalism to exalt the chimerical principle of natural law—the 
notion of a life ordered “according to nature, promulgated by God solely through human 
reason.”57  Taney used natural law to “prove” the inferiority of blacks, deny blacks 
citizenship, and cement the right of the white majority to own slaves as higher than any 
constitutional sanction.58  He reasoned that slavery was a natural institution, that the 
“African race was ‘made subject’ to ‘white dominion’ by ‘the order of nature.’”59 For 
Taney, slavery reflected a “divinely ordained distribution of [white] power and 
responsibility [over blacks]” akin to a natural hierarchical power structure of ant and 
beehives.60  Taney did not rely on the Constitution to interpret the fugitive slave law and 
void it; rather he relied on the darkest side of popular constitutionalism to elevate natural 
law above the Constitution.  By so doing, he did not taint the integrity of the Constitution; 
he issued a decision that was not counter-majoritarian, and was widely popular because it 
permitted elected officials to preserve American terrorism against blacks and the 
majority’s sovereignty and sense of safety and security by detaining blacks in a perpetual 





                                                 
56 For a discussion of the view that “tyranny of the majority” is a misnomer, see Waldron, The Core of 
the Case against Judicial Review, 1395-1401. 
57 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed.  
58 Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 48-54; Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1857); Samuel Tyler, Memoir of Roger Brooke Taney (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1872), 579. 
59 Ibid., Gregg D. Crane, Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature (United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 148-157. 
60 Crane, Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature, fn 60. 
61 Cornel West, Hope on a Tightrope: Words & Wisdom Cornel West (New York: NY Smileybooks, 
2008), 14-15. 
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analysis of judicial review through the prism of popular constitutionalism in ways that he 
may not have imagined,62 but are particularly relevant to balancing the competing 
interests during the GWOT.63 
C. BALANCING JUDICIAL REVIEW AND POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM  
Is judicial review counter-majoritarian?  Put another way, does the practice of 
judicial review inveigh against the positive democratic tenets of popular 
constitutionalism—public participation in creating public value: enhancing life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness for all while fostering a more perfect union?  John Hart Ely 
explores the case for arguing judicial review does not inveigh against popular 
constitutionalism and is not counter-majoritarian, offering that “since the Constitution 
itself was submitted for and received popular ratification. . . . judges do not check the 
people, the Constitution does, which means the people are ultimately checking 
themselves.”64  He describes two (2) theoretical concepts of judicial review, 
interpretivisim and noninterpetivisim that support popular constitutionalism—civic 
participation in creating public value, as follows. 
Interpretivisim calls for judicial reliance on the provisions within the four (4) 
corners of the Constitution to interpret and apply legislative and executive actions in 
balancing competing interests, whereas, non-interpretivisim calls for judicial reliance on 
outside factors in addition to the provisions within the four corners of the Constitution.  
Since interpretivisim requires judges to “confine themselves to enforcing norms that are 
stated expressly in the Constitution,” arguably, it is not counter-majortarian but rather is 
consistent with representative democracy.65  Also, upon further analysis, because as Ely 
                                                 
62 See, Crane, Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature, explaining how in the wake of Dred 
Scott lawyers and literary figures fought to interpret and create constitutional law reflecting a moral 
consensus that slavery was evil.  
63 David Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of 
Crises,” Georgetown University Law Center Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 519442, 
Michigan Law Review, 101, no. 8 (August 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=519442 (accessed August 18, 
2008).  
64 Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 8.  
65 Ibid., 1-2. 
 19
discloses several constitutional provisions, it invites the justices to look beyond its four 
(4) corners66 when making difficult substantive choices among competing fundamental 
values and principles.67 The dichotomy between interpretivisim and non-interpretivism 
melts away, and with it, the notion that judicial review undermines public participation in 
creating and interpreting constitutional law and creating public value for all becomes 
suspect. 
Ely’s post Dred Scott judicial review, looks to the Constitution and locates 
permission in its express provisions to imply “a line of growth [] intended, [to] identify 
the sorts of evils against which the provision was directed and to move against their 
contemporary counterparts.”68  Progressing, slowly, post Dred Scott judicial review did 
not examine the behavior of “ants and beehives” for instruction on protecting civil 
liberties during wartime.69  Rather, with respect for popular constitutionalism’s purpose, 
civic participation in creating public value for all or more succinctly democratic 
liberalization, judicial review examines the political process on both the federal and state 
levels, “which is where values are properly identified, weighed, and accommodated . . . 
[to ensure the process is] open to those of all viewpoints on something approaching an 
equal basis.”70  Even so, the theoretical controversy continues in the post 9/11 era of the 
GWOT and presses against the perceived dangers of judicial review to democracy.   
                                                 
66 Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 13-14. 
67 Ibid., Quoting Alexander Bickel, Ely writes “The Court is ‘an institution charged with the evolution 
and application of society’s fundamental principles,” and its “constitutional function,” accordingly, is “to 
define values and proclaim principles,” 43. 
68 Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 13-14; Cole, “Judging the Next 
Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crises,” 2566-2567. 
69 Although as recent as 1944, interpretations of natural law permitted America to evacuate and detain 
American citizens of Japanese descent, the United State Supreme Court, through its power of judicial 
review, has since sounded an alarm that the use of racial and ethnic profiling in preventative detention 
determinations would be met with strict scrutiny. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 
(1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting) (arguing that the principle underlying the Korematsu decision “lies about 
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an 
urgent need”); and Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing 
Korematsu to the Dred Scott decision) with the line of enemy combatant detainee cases.  
70 Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, 74; Crane Race, Citizenship, and Law 
in American Literature, 25.  
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1. Non-Judicial Review:  A Process for Balancing Competing Interests 
Holding tight to the notion that judicial review is illegitimate, Tushnet suggests 
non-judicial review should replace judicial review by the courts.  He argues that, unlike 
non-judicial institutions, i.e., members of the United States Senate, judges have “a 
disinterested desire to interpret the Constitution correctly” because they do not have “an 
interest in satisfying the demands of some constituency in a position to affect the judge’s 
tenure in the job.”71  For Tushnet, judges lack incentives, and are therefore, ill suited for 
the job of balancing competing interests.  By contrast, “non-judicial institutions can 
balance competing constitutional interests  . . . because they have incentives guiding them 
toward balancing.”72  The incentives are not necessarily associated with political 
expediency—re-election, Tushnet assures, but rather “as reflecting considered 
constitutional judgment . . . .”73.  Moreover, Tushnet argues with company74 since the 
Constitution is not a suicide pact75 that even during emergency periods, where the threat 
to civil liberties is heightened, the judgment of the political branches on the propriety of 
the imposition of extra-constitutional emergency measures, rather than the judgment of 
the judiciary governs.76 
Tushnet’s advocacy for protecting democracy from so-called disinterested, 
disincentivized judges devoid of considered constitutional judgment necessary to balance 
competing interests correctly has at its core, non-judicial review, and relies on a 
perceived lack of judicial patriotism and judicial review’s lack of material relevancy to 
democratic sustainability and success.  So, for Tushnet, protecting democracy requires  
 
 
                                                 
71 Tushnet, “Non-Judicial Review,” 455-456. 
72 Ibid., 466-467, 491-492. 
73 Ibid., 467. 
74 Tushnet, “Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime,” 2003 Wisconsin Law 
Review, 253; Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crimes Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 Yale Law Journal 1011 (2003): 1015-1134.  
75 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
76 Tushnet, “Non-Judicial Review,” 455-456, 466-467. 
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casting balancing of the competing interests out of bounds of judicial review and into the 
territory of the political branches.77  Tushnet concludes his essay by inviting scholars to 
conduct more research to determine whether judicial review is truly necessary.78   
2. Judicial Review:  A Process for Balancing Competing Interests 
Answering Tushnet’s call for more research, Samuel Issacharoff writes American 
“courts have developed a process-based institutionally-oriented framework for examining 
the legality of governmental action” during wartime, 79 as opposed to a values or rights 
based approach, which necessitates a consideration of “what the content of the underlying 
rights ought to be” when balancing competing interests during wartime.80  Issacharoff 
seems to suggest like Tushnet, that judges have a disinterested distance with respect to 
balancing competing interests, but unlike Tushnet, not because they lack incentive, 
considered constitutional judgment to balance competing interests correctly or lack of 
material relevancy to democracy.   
For Issacharoff, the process-based, institutionally oriented approach adopted by 
the courts for examining the legality of government action during wartime is politics 
reinforcing,81 and hence, judicial review advances democracy because the process-based 
approach reflects the courts acceptance of “joint political judgment of how liberty and 
security tradeoffs ought to be made.”82  In other words, where politically accountable 
institutions—the legislative and/or executive branches, have spoken the courts, “shift the 
responsibility [of balancing the conflict over rights and security during times of national 
emergencies] away from themselves and toward the joint action of the most democratic 
                                                 
77 See Posner, questioning whether judges know enough about the consequences of particular 
measures taken for the protection of national security to be able to strike a proper balance, Not a Suicide 
Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency, 35-37. 
78 Ibid., 491-492. 
79 Samuel Issacharoff, “Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional 
Process Approach to Rights during Wartime,” www.//media-server.amazon.com/exec/drm/amzproxy.cgi 
(accessed September 6, 2008). 
80 Ibid., 1. 
81 Ibid., 9. 
82 Ibid., 2-3. 
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branches of the government.”83  Issacharoff proffers, on the issue of weighting the scale 
of rights and security, that historically where the political branches had acted “for 
legitimate reasons in closing the courthouse doors” judicial review yields, 
appropriately.84   
Conversely, recent history has shown where the political branches close the 
courthouse doors illegitimately, unconstitutionally, judicial review will pry them open 
and apply a rights-based approach to balancing competing interests.85  In this fashion, 
notwithstanding its critics, judicial review serves democracy not only institutionally, 
curbing “the excesses of majority power by voiding legislation [and executive action] 
contrary to the principles of justice expressed in the Constitution,”86 but also by 
preserving human dignity, a democratic value of the individual right to be left alone by 
the government.  Put another way, under Issacharoff’s approach, judicial review balances 
civil liberties and public safety/security for the mutual benefit of the government and the 
governed. 
The caveat, because too much or too little liberty or too much or too little security 
can undermine human security, human liberty, national security, and U.S. legitimacy,87 
building a better understanding of how judicial review contributes to balancing 
competing interests during national emergencies, and in particular, the GWOT is 
                                                 
83 Issacharoff, “Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process 
Approach to Rights during Wartime,” 3-7.  
84 Ibid., 10-11 citing Ex parte McCardle, as the death knell of the rights-based approach for balancing 
competing interests during wartime because Congress “had stripped the court of jurisdiction to review the 
fate of a newspaper editor held by military authorities for trial before a military commission for having 
published incendiary pro-Confederate tracts,” a valid institutional process constrained the courts from 
inquiring into the ‘motives of the legislature.’” Ex McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 606 (1868). 
85 See line of enemy combatant cases supra fn 7; Judge Richard M. Urbina, ordered the release of 17 
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay Cuba, William Glaberson, “Judge Orders 17 Detainees at Guantanamo 
Freed,” New York Times, October 7, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08detain.html?_r=1&scp=6&sq=guantanamo%20bay%2
0federal%20court&st=cse (accessed January 26, 2009). 
86 Ibid., Crane, Race, Citizenship, and Law in American Literature, 25; David S. Law, “A Theory of 
Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112613 
(accessed October 24, 2008) explaining how judicial review operates as a mechanism for keeping the 
government within the limits of its power,” 10-14. 
87 Samantha Power, “Legitimacy and Competence” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the 
Bush Doctrine, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
137-138, 141-145. 
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warranted.88  Pinpointing where the major fault line exists separating supporters and non-
supporters of judicial review, before the next emergency, may serve to breakthrough 
barriers.  To accord greater opportunity for investing judicial review theorists’ collective 
intellectual capital and energies toward the creation and implementation of progressive 
HLDS strategies aimed at securing America, preserving her democracy and creating 
public value globally by promoting genuine democratization or liberalization, which 
research suggests matters greatly to mitigating extremism, and hence, reducing 
terrorism.89 
So, consider arguing that it, judicial review as a function, chokes off public 
participation in creating and interpreting constitutional law and in enhancing life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness for all the while fostering a more perfect union.  Opponents 
of judicial review focus on a perceived transfer of power away from the public to an 
alleged disinterested, disincentivized, body of judges devoid of considered constitutional 
judgment necessary to balance competing interests correctly.  The rejoinder: proponents 
of judicial review hail it as a function that rests on the constitutional foundation of shared 
sovereignty that serves to stimulate public participation in governing.  For proponents, 
judicial review is instructive to how public participation in a democracy is coordinated to 
serve competing interests mutually beneficially, particularly during national emergencies 
when just balancing of competing interests is paramount.90  The question then is does 
judicial review really foster Juristocracy, judicial despotism?  Or, as Keith E. 
Whittington and David S. Law, among others, suggest:  a democracy that respects human 
dignity. 
                                                 
88 David Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of 
Crises,” Georgetown University Law Center Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 519442, 
Michigan Law Review, 101, no. 8 (August 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=519442 (accessed August 18, 
2008), 2565-2594. 
89 The judicial role in safeguarding the rule of law and human rights is key to genuine democracy and 
reducing political violence--terrorism. Kaye et al., “More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and 
Political Violence in the Arab World,” 170-171, 173-176. 
90 Toasting attorney Tom Wilner for representing detainees in Guantanamo, FBI director Mueller 
exclaimed “He’s doing what an American should.” Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the 
War on Terror Turned into a War on American Ideals, 204-206. 
 24
D. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS IN SHARED POLITICAL 
SPACES 
Keith E. Whittington explains how moved James Madison was with the “promise 
of [an impartial and independent] judiciary as a way of securing [the] union and 
preserving the peace” noting “. . . ‘the tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to 
the sword and a dissolution of the compact.’”91  In addressing concerns of representation, 
Whittington quotes John F. Kennedy to remind Americans to maintain interest in how 
judges operate in the political space open to them for governing stating where it is 
“impossible for people [] to secure adequate relief through the normal political processes 
. . . .the judicial branch will meet the responsibility.”92   
He explains the emerging literature on judicial review validates that “[judicial 
review] does not fit the “counter-majoritarian framework.”93  The literature reveals that 
political leaders, policymakers, activists and the public at-large seeking through 
delegation to “insulate their policy preferences from future political majorities [and/or] to 
void statutes passed by previous governing coalitions” occupy the political space open to 
judges.94  This shared political space allows public/private collaboration on balancing 
competing interests and turns the notion that judicial review fosters despotism as opposed 
to promoting democracy on its head.   
                                                 
91 Whittington, ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand:” Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial 
Review by the United States Supreme Court,” 586. 
92 Ibid., 585, 589. 
93 Whingtton reasons that U.S. political leaders delegate tasks to the courts, because “the courts may 
be able to perform more effectively or reliably than elected officials can acting directly.” He explores how 
the “structural characteristics of U.S. political systems encourage cooperation between judges and political 
leaders to obtain common objectives.” ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand:” Political Supports for the 
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court,” 584; Law, “the factual premise that 
judicial review is counter-majoritarian has come under sustained empirical attack from multiple directions,” 
4’ Mark A. Graber, “Foreword: From the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to Juristocracy and the Political 
Construction of Judicial Power,” 65 MD. L. Rev. 1, (2006), 5-10; Terri Peretti, “An Empirical Analysis of 
Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch,” in The Judiciary and American Democracy: Alexander 
Bickel, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, ed. Kenneth D. 
Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo, (2005), 123, 123-141. 
94 Ibid., 584-585.  
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Whittington exposes how judicial review through operating in shared political 
space with the public is democratic.95  First, he finds support for judicial review in the 
appointment or election of judges who manifest a willingness to invalidate legislative or 
executive acts.96  Second “in the encouragement of specific judicial action consistent 
with the political needs of coalition leaders” comprised of members from both the private 
and public sector97 Whittington notes judicial review is welcome.  Where coalition 
leaders are unable to persuade constituents or mobilize legislative allies to adapt policy, 
sympathetic judicial allies may accomplish indirectly what the coalition leaders could not 
accomplish directly.98  Third, “in the congenial reception of judicial action after it has 
been taken,”99 and, lastly, “in the public expression of generalized support for judicial 
supremacy in the articulation of Constitutional commitments” judicial review operating 
in shared space advances peaceable democracy.100  
Who can forget Bush v. Gore?  Where although there was profound disagreement 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, there was no appeal to the sword or dissolution 
of the compact, but, rather non-violent public acceptance.101  Consider also, the line of 
enemy combatant cases, where the court progressively held that suspected terrorists were 
entitled to constitutional protections.  Again, despite disappointment, the sword remains 
in its sheath and America remains unified.  In short, supports for judicial review is  
 
 
                                                 
95 Whingtton, ““Interpose Your Friendly Hand:” Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review 
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97 Ibid., 584-585. 
98 Ibid., 591-592. On the issue of civil rights, Whittington discusses how judicial review can overcome 
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100 Ibid., 585.-587. 
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located in a shared public/private political space where trust in judicial leadership102 and 
strategic planning103 for the preservation of America’s genuine democracy and the 
people’s security and civil liberties operates.104   
1. Judicial Review and America’s Legitimacy 
Professor Samantha Power, writing on the need for collaborative efforts in 
developing strategy after the Bush Doctrine,105 trumpets judicial review as a process for 
balancing competing interests as well as for enhancing U.S. global legitimacy, matching 
deeds to values, as it champions human rights.106  In noting, “an alienated public will 
undermine the ability of U.S. foreign policy makers to achieve their aims”107 Power, 
directs attention to the similar objectives of HLDS and national security strategies.108  
She and Zibigniew Brzezinski, author of “Second Chance,”109 advocate strongly for 
greater American public collaboration (and sacrifice) in domestic and foreign policy 
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American Superpower (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 215. 
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matters to enhance U.S. legitimacy in leading the world after the Bush Doctrine.110  
Leading necessarily requires as Power points out “the organic capacity to step into ‘the 
enemy’s shoes’”111 and for West112 and Brzezinski, it requires a global discourse about 
rights, which discharges to the benefit of human dignity: 
America needs to identify itself with the quest for universal human 
dignity, a dignity that embodies both freedom and democracy but also 
implies respect for cultural diversity and recognizes that persisting 
injustices in the human condition must be remedied.113   
Brzezinski’s human dignity is the central challenge inherent in a phenomenon he 
calls the “global political awakening,” a “socially massive, politically radicalizing, and 
geographically universal” movement that historically “has been anti-imperial, politically 
anti-Western, and emotionally increasingly anti-American.”114  Without focus on human 
dignity, Brzezinski explains the combined impact of the historical sentiments of global 
political awakening and modern technology is a recipe for increased terrorism. 
Similar to Brzezinski, Power and West, Professor Fathali M. Moghaddam calls on 
Western nations and publics to pay attention, “Twenty-first-century terrorists are global 
and literally treat the world as a global village.”115  Citing the findings of the Pew Global 
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of anti-Americanism is “that there is no peace because there is no justice, and the source 
of a lot of injustice is seen to be U.S. Foreign policy.116  He submits understanding the 
terrorists’ point of view is imperative to peace and reducing terrorist sympathizers:   
From the terrorists’ point of view, there can be no peace without justice—
as justice is defined by them of course.  This is a vital point, because it is 
on this issue that terrorists gain some sympathy in parts of the world—
both Western and non-Western.  Sympathy for espoused terrorist causes is 
associated with, and may arise from, American foreign policy and related 
sentiments of anti-Americanism.117 
Moghaddam goes on to identify as a contributing factor to terrorism the 
exportation of an American democracy that fails to speak to the “personal and collective 
identities and situations” of persons “on the ground floor of the staircase to terrorism.”118  
This impatient democracy imposed by the West seeks to impose it onto and into the Near 
and Middle East, is immature and does not possess the characteristics of Brzezinski’s 
human dignity119 and although it provides for “free and fair elections,” ground floor 
occupants of the staircase to terrorism elect despots, dictators as leaders, Why? because 
contextualized democracy is missing.  In other words, and in part, the cultural 
characteristics of judicial review carried out by an independent judiciary that permits all 
Americans to participate in the political spaces judges operate, to engage in concerted 
action in opposition to or in support for political actions, are largely absent in the Near 
and Middle East.120  Often, the only available opposition vote in a non-contextualized 
democracy is cast for Islamic fundamentalists or radicals who support terrorism, directly 
or indirectly.  Islamic fundamentalists or radicals, who the despots or dictators in high 
office marginalize through appeasement, allows them to exercise control over mosques 
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autonomously.  These fundamentalists are permitted to tax congregants, to mold and 
shape the young minds of some men and women into terrorists in exchange for not 
interfering in democratic governmental affairs that among other egregious things refuse 
to recognize the rights of women.121   
For Moghaddam, an impatiently imposed de-contextualized democracy sees “free 
and fair elections as the end result, rather than the starting point, of growth toward a 
democratic system.”122  In an impatient democracy, an independent judiciary is 
circumscribed or absent; mechanisms for making government accountable for its actions, 
is circumscribed or absent; opportunities for developing grassroots participation, where 
citizens openly exchange opinions and information, is circumscribed or absent.123  In 
such democracies, a history of judicial review of political acts that deny rights, which are 
inherent to human dignity and from which future political action is checked, is 
circumscribed or altogether missing.124  In short, without judicial review, the rule of law 
is silenced, the legitimacy of emerging democracies is undermined and the individual 
rights of a people go unrecognized, and legitimate grievances go unredressed, thus 
opening space for terrorists to recruit ground floor occupants on the staircase to terrorism 
with ease.125 
David Cole orients the reader to the long-term benefits America’s judicial review 
has provided to preserving individual rights by “. . . narrowing the range of rights-
violative options available to the government in the next emergency.”126  In explaining a 
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revisionist view of judicial review of public safety and security measures enacted during 
an emergency or after it has ended, Cole discusses judicial imposition of “a degree of 
restraint on the government’s actions during the next emergency”127 that is essential for 
sustaining America’s sovereignty, promoting public value and legitimacy globally.128  
Rejecting Tushnet’s and Gross’s argument that granting the political branches extra-
constitutional authority129 to impose emergency public safety and security measures, 
during times of crises, Cole and other scholars warn that during an emergency, panic130 
becomes the primary driver that the public and their political representatives respond to 
as “security measures launched in its name are approved.”131   
What actions then can the American public take during the present global political 
awakening to enhance human dignity and U.S. legitimacy, before the next emergency to 
guard against security measures driven by terrorist-inspired panic?  The researcher 
suggests collaborating, within shared political space on those factors the Supremes view 
as essential in determining the appropriateness of suspending or limiting civil liberties 
during national emergencies and how those factors should be balanced and why, would 
be of use.  Such collaboration may lead the public to endorse extra-constitutional 
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pact.  Or, it may not, upon considering “Constitutions are chains with which men bind 
themselves in their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day of 
their frenzy.”132   
Before 9/11, in saner moments, Professor Cornel West championed the promise 
of judicial review and progressive legal practice to promoting social activism in response 
to “civic terrorism” resulting from “political neglect and social invisibility.”133  After 
9/11, West, in decrying America’s imperialistic behavior, and unilateral militarism built 
on “a narrow patriotism and a revenge-driven lust for a war on terrorism,” wrote that 
enhancing U.S. legitimacy and enriching global democracy requires: 
that we keep track of the intimate link between domestic issues and 
foreign policies . . . . What we do abroad affects what we can do here and 
what we do here shapes what we can do abroad . . . . It is impossible to 
talk about democracy matters on a global scale without engaging these 
questions.134 
2. Judicial Review and Human Rights and Social Justice 
Regarding questions about human rights and social justice in America and the 
Middle East, Westenian philosophy supplicates “progressive lawyers to adopt a two-
pronged ideological strategy consist[ing] of an unrelenting defense of substantive 
democracy and all-inclusive liberty (as best articulated in the Bill of Rights).”  
Accordingly, West shares awareness with Moghaddam,135 Kaye, et al.,136 and Crane that 
judicial review performed by an independent judiciary invites and operates in a 
public/private collaborative world of constitutional rights: 
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Rights denote a protected sphere of personal autonomy and liberty, whose 
precise shape and dimension are unspecified.  To amplify the term by 
referring to preserving life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness does not 
really resolve the ambiguity (the familiar triad does not, for instance, tell 
us how to adjudicate conflicts between different people exercising their 
“rights”).  This ambiguity is both the product of and predicate for the 
continuing cultural and political dialogue through which American Society 
frames and devises its notions of basic individual freedoms.137 
Significantly, the familiar triad does not reveal how to balance competing 
interests during the GWOT either.  That said, the familiar triad can serve to inspire 
publics to participate in a dialogue about balancing competing interests, post 9/11 and 
pre, during the next emergency.  It can inspire publics to journey into the space of 
constitutional ambiguity138 where National Security and HLDS are linked and where 
judicial review operates; to journey there with comfort and trust in judicial leadership and 
strategic planning capacity to generate public value.   
David S. Law writes convincingly about judicial leadership and strategic planning 
capacity manifested though the exercise of judicial review, stating and explaining how 
judicial review can be understood as an institutional mechanism that facilitates popular 
control over the government by conveying information and shaping beliefs about how the 
government behaves and how the people are likely to respond.139  He explores how 
judicial review serves an important governmental monitoring140 and oversight141 function 
on behalf of the public (the collective principal in an agency relationship with the 
government as agent)142 who sounds a “fire alarm,” by bringing a complaint before the 
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court, after suspecting political branch misconduct.143  The courts respond by gathering 
reliable information and developing raw data from executive and legislative activities, 
which forms the basis of the alleged misconduct, and uses its professional expertise that 
members of the general public are unlikely to possess to analyze the executive and 
legislation activities for constitutional consistency.144  The court via judicial review, 
provides signals145 to the public, including: “the media and the academy, [] opposition 
parties, interest groups and the bar” to cooperate146 with one another to coordinate147 
peaceable action against the political branches where public safety and security measures 
revile civil liberties too strongly.148  For Law, judicial review contrary to Waldron’s 
protestations149 provides an efficient and economical way for the public at-large with the 
opportunity to participate collaboratively150 and peaceably151 in genuine democracies.  In 
short, applying Law’s analysis judicial review is material and relevant to democracy’s 
quest to reduce terrorism, because it arms the public with reliable information.  It opens a 
conduit for the public to operate in the political spaces judges operate, to engage in  
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concerted action in opposition to or in support for legislative and executive acts,152 
particularly those relating to balancing competing interests, during the GWOT and 
beyond.153   
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW MATTERS IN DEMOCRACY’S QUEST 
TO TERROR HYPOTHESES 
A. HYPOTHESES 
Based on the literature review above, the researcher has identified three (3) 
hypotheses regarding whether the Supremes views on balancing the competing interests 
and judicial review performed by an independent judiciary is material and relevant to 
democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism:  
1. Counter-majoritarianism:  Judicial review inveighs against popular 
constitutionalism (e.g., it precludes public participation in creating 
constitutional law through action in politics) by voiding political branch 
action.  Hence, judicial review is illegitimate, immaterial and irrelevant to 
democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism. 
2. Post Counter-majoritarianism:  Judicial review serves the strategic 
function of galvanizing and coordinating public participation in the 
political spaces judges operate to interpret and create constitutional law.  
Judicial review is material and relevant to democracy’s quest to reduce 
terrorism because it provides a conduit for seeking redress of legitimate 
grievances through nonviolent means. 
3. Legitimacy:  Judicial review serves to enhance the legitimacy of a 
sovereign and to promote a contextualized democracy by upholding the 
rule of law, individual rights and freedoms with transparency.  Judicial 
review is material and relevant to democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism 
because it is a stabilizing force against tyranny.  
The hypotheses will guide the reader’s exploration of the views of Chief Justice 
Joseph R. Weisberger (Ret.) of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, on balancing the 
competing interests during the GWOT.  The Chief Justice has served in a judicial 
capacity for over forty-five years and continues even in retirement to hear and decide 
cases.  In addition to having graduated from Brown University Magna Cum Laude and 
Harvard University School of Law, the Chief Justice holds 12 honorary degrees.  He has 
also served on or chaired numerous boards and conferences, including Past Chairman 
Appellate Judges Conference ABA; Past Chairman National Conference State Trial 
Judges; Past Member House of Delegates ABA; Past Member Council of Judicial 
Administration Division, ABA; Past Member of American Law Institute, Past Member 
and Senior Faculty N.Y.U. Appellate Seminar; Member Education Committee of 
 36
Appellate Judges Conference.  He is a Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and 
has been a faculty member of the National Judicial College since 1966.  Appointed by 
Pope John Paul II to office of Knight Commander with Star Order of St. Gregory, the 
Chief Justice also served in the United States Navy from 1941 to 1946, released with the 
rank of Lieutenant Commander.   
The hypotheses will also guide the reader through an examination of the survey 
data revealing the Supremes’ views on balancing competing interests during the GWOT.  
Twenty-two out of fifty-five Supremes responded to the researcher’s request for their 
participation in the survey, thirteen provided answers to the survey questions, ten 
provided answers to all 30 questions and two (2) provided answers to one (1) question.  
The remaining Supremes graciously provided reasons for their decision not to participate, 
which ranged from legislative/ethical prohibition, policy concerns, or the appearance of 
impropriety.   
The researcher provides selected portions of the Chief Justice’s narrative 
organized to assist the reader to locate quotations on particular topics.  That said, because 
his narrative addresses more than one topic, the decision as to where to place quotations 
is subjective, and not everything on the same topic is in the same section.  Moreover, 
although the hypotheses above will serve to inform the researcher’s concluding thoughts, 
aside from the interview questioning, editorial comment of the Chief Justice’s narrative 
and survey data have been limited to the extent possible, editorializing only to direct 
attention to points of significance and to put the data in context.  This process requires 
greater critical analysis on the part of the reader, but hopefully, the quasi-direct access to 
the Supremes’ views will prove more useful to Socratic questioning, which as Professor 
West offers “requires a relentless self-examination and critique of institutions of 
authority, motivated by an endless quest for intellectual integrity and moral consistency. . 
. . [i]t is manifest in a fearless speech—parrhesia—that unsettles, unnerves, and unhouses 
people from their uncritical sleepwalking.”154   
                                                 
154 Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight against Imperialism, 16. 
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B. STATE SUPREMES BALANCE 
For judicial review theorists and non-judicial review theorists alike, constitutions 
are held in high esteem.  Non-judicial review theorists quarrel not with the existence of 
constitutions, but with the power of judges to interpret them.   
1. Question 1 
Q1. Whether the integrity of Constitutions (federal and/or state) is paramount 
when balancing the competing interests during the GWOT. 
For the Supremes who interpret constitutions, Figure 1 illustrates their responses 
to survey question 1. 
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Figure 1.   Supremes’ responses to survey question 1. 
Researcher:  I begin with a personal observation.  The United States had 
counterterrorism policies in place before the horrific events of September 11, but there 
did not appear to be a concerted national effort to deal effectively with terrorism the way 
there is today, there was no GWOT.  It is undisputed that America wants to defeat 
terrorism.  The challenge is to preserve America’s identity as a free society, 
simultaneously, so neither the GWOT nor oppressive public safety and security measures 
implemented in its name become America’s new normal, and thus, define its national or 
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global identity.  There must be a collective and concerted effort amongst foreign and 
domestic government officials, and the public to address terrorism, diplomatically; 
otherwise, the U.S. may be headed down a road that could lead to a contraction of civil 
liberties in a way that getting back to America the way it existed pre September 11 would 
be very challenging.  America cannot win the so-called war on terror solely through law 
enforcement, picking up arms and waging a military battle.   
Chief Justice:  Absolutely a delicate balance is required.  Self-preservation is a 
basic instinct of humankind.  Men and women will do what they need to preserve 
themselves and their existence.  But, it is very important in a society, such as ours, that 
we preserve ourselves in the model and the institutions that we have nurtured for over 
two centuries. This is part of our being.  It is a part of what we are and if we lose those 
characteristics we have lost the war, we have lost the war . . . if in the course of fighting 
Nazism, we became Nazis we would have lost the war to Adolph Hitler.  Thank the Lord 
we did not.  We participated in a global war in World War II and we emerged a free 
country.  We participated in a Cold War and we emerged from that as a free country.  
And, I would hopefully predict that we would emerge from the war against our 
subversive terrorist, whether they be jihadist al Qaeda or whatever form they will take--
we shall emerge from that as a free country and I say that as a veteran of World War II. 
Researcher:  Is there a relationship between America as a free country and 
upholding the integrity of the Constitution? 
Chief Justice:  The integrity of our Constitution is, to a great extent, the 
definition of our national existence without our Constitution (federal and state) we would 
not be the nation that we are.  And, therefore, homeland defense and security measures 
and the war on terror demands the premise that we are protecting the nation that is 




2. Question 6  
Q6: It is essential that Congress and the Executive Granch act in concert in 












Figure 2.   Supremes’ responses to survey question 6. 
Researcher:  Is there a connection between preserving the integrity of our 
Constitution and improving the image of America globally, which can reduce the spread 
of terror?   
Chief Justice:  America has been described as a beacon on the hill just as the 
statute of liberty has been the emblem of a free state and a refuge from tyranny so, 
indeed, is our nations of laws and liberties a model for the world.  It has been a model 
since its founding.  Now, I cannot say that all people in all nations will love America 
because of its freedom and because of its idealism that has always been perhaps a dream 
that has never achieved full accomplishment.  I think we were despised by imperial 
Japan.  I think we were despised by the regime of Adolph Hitler.  I think tyrants despised 
us throughout our history.  However most people and in most nations throughout the 
world respected America for her ideals and the purity of her motives.  I believe that this 
characterization is part of our reputation part of our reason for being and is basic to our 
reputation throughout the world.   
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Researcher:  What message, then, should America be imparting to the world 
during this time of national emergency, the global war on terror, our notion of freedom as 
embodied in the Constitution?   
Chief Justice:  However devoted we are to our constitutional system of a 
republican government we must realize, of course, that all peoples in all times do not 
necessarily agree with the principles of democracy or the principles that are embodied in 
our constitutional form of government.  There have been and are nations who are ruled 
under monarchial principles who are devoted to a system of government that for example 
may have a very strong mixture of religious dominance as opposed to separation of 
church and state.  There are countries in which a religious influence is expected, taken for 
granted and highly prized.  I will give you one historical example in our own country.   
Roger Williams was disdained by Massachusetts and Connecticut because he 
espoused religious tolerance.  Massachusetts and Connecticut did not.  The puritanical 
government in those two colonies absolutely considered tolerance to be a vice rather than 
a virtue.  Now, there are some countries in the world today some of them devoted to 
Islamic law where a democracy such as ours would not be considered desirable, but 
government by clerics would be considered the ideal form of government.  We have to 
respect those differences. 
Researcher:  What role can the state judiciary play in assisting those with 
divergent views from ours to choose methods other than violence to govern?  Put another 
way, what can the judiciary do to affect America’s global image, positively during this 
time of national emergency? 
Chief Justice:  Well the state judiciary and the federal judiciary are responsible 
for enforcing the laws that exist in our state and nation.  They are responsible for 
supporting the Constitution of their respective states and the Federal Constitution.  They, 
of course, are not responsible for sustaining or enforcing the statutes and laws of other 
countries.  However, insofar as there are citizens or nationals of those countries in our 
nation their views are entitled to respect.  They are entitled to believe as they believe and  
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under our First Amendment, they may express those beliefs and both state and federal 
courts must respect that expression and must safeguard it as part of the American system 
of tolerance and freedom of expression.   
3. Questions 28 and 29 
Q28: Modern terrorism may require the States’ Judiciary as “independent 
tribunals of justice’ to serve an increased role against the “assumption of 
power in the legislative or executive branch. . .to resist every 
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated in the constitution by the 
declaration of rights” 
Q29: The State’s judiciary may have a critical role in national security 
measures or more precisely homeland defense and security because the 
National Strategy for Information Sharing of 2007 strongly encourages 
federal, state, local and tribal governments to share intelligence 
information relating to terrorist activity. 
 
Modern terrorism may require States' Judiciary to 




       Strongly Agree









to resist political branch encroachment
upon rights
because of the National Strategy for
Information Sharing of 2007
 
Figure 3.   Supremes’ responses to survey questions 28 and 29. 
Researcher:  So, the courts role in enhancing the legitimacy of America globally 
can include— 
Chief Justice:  Our government being viewed as legitimate is a great source of 
strength; I think a great source of strength among civilized nations.  There may be nations 
or people living within nations who are disinterested in legitimacy and interested only in 
what they consider are right or wrong.  For example, the terrorists against whom we 
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hoped to be protected are generally not concerned with legitimacy except legitimacy as 
they construe it and legitimacy as they construe it would be vastly different from the type 
of legitimacy we have created in the American experiment.  Not everyone is interested in 
democracy.  This is the one thing that Americans must accept that while democracy is our 
main objective and pride not all the people in the world want democracy or ever have 
wanted it.  Now, I believe that judicial review, which was really declared by John 
Marshal in Marbury v. Madison has been the great source of strength to our government 
and to our democracy by keeping it channeled within areas that protect individual liberty 
against the power of the state it has given great legitimacy to the American government 
system. 
4. Question 7 
Q7: America’s image globally is a key factor to consider when weighing the 
competing interests of civil liberties and public safety/security measures 








Figure 4.   Supremes’ responses to survey question 7.  
Researcher:  Is judicial review counter-majoritarian? 
Chief Justice:  Judicial review is not designed to be counter-majoritarian, unless 
it has to be.  The court is not desirous of acting in a counter-majoritarian way unless the 
majority has impinged upon fundamental rights or has created a suspect classification. 
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Researcher:  --the majority being the political branches? 
Chief Justice:  The majority being the political branches or even the public vote, 
I don’t think there is any question that even segregation in Mississippi would have been 
supported by popular vote, in the 1950s, I have no doubt about it.  The court does not act 
in a counter-majoritarian way, joyfully, but it moves when it must to protect fundamental 
rights and to prevent the creation of suspect classification or invidious discrimination by 
a majority.  Whether the Founders intended it to be so, and I doubt that they really gave it 
much thought at the time they were devising the original Constitution in 1787 or the Bill 
of Rights in 1791.   
Researcher:  You would not, then, agree that judicial review inveighs against 
popular constitutionalism. 
Chief Justice:  I do not agree that judicial review inveighs against popular 
constitutionalism.  I believe that our actions in politics create a context in which 
constitutional law could be considered and applied, but I believe that the concept of 
judicial review provides an expert professional oversight.  It creates the limits upon our 
constitutional actions.  I do not believe that the meaning and the application of the 
Constitution should be decided by random activity or even by popular vote.  It is not 
susceptible to that kind of interpretation.  Our 200 hundred years of constitutional history 
I believe would support my point of view. 
Researcher:  Would you say judicial review serves a strategic function? 
Chief Justice:  Yes.  Limits upon our constitutional actions cannot be discerned 
from random activities of millions of citizens who have not seriously considered the 
question of constitutional application.  I think that it requires an organized professional 
oversight.  
Researcher:  So, the strategic function of judicial review is organizational. 
Chief Justice:  The activities of individuals in our society create a context in 
which judicial review takes place.  In other words, the current of ideas has an influence 
without question upon judicial decisions. 
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Researcher:  Does judicial review invite public participation in the political 
spaces judges operate.   
Chief Justice:  I think that it tends to be somewhat remote from public 
participation. 
Researcher:  Remote--but if members of the public are not equipped on their 
own to grapple with the complexities of constitutional application . . . 
Chief Justice:  Oh, yes and I suppose we have to recognize that under the law the 
court cannot go out and simply decide cases or questions in the abstract.  They must 
await litigation to be brought by a party an individual or a group of individuals.  They 
bring a question before the court for determination.  The court just cannot reach out and 
decide issues unless people bring cases or controversies before them for adjudication and 
it goes up through the system.  It starts out in a State or Federal court and gradually winds 
its way up to the United States Supreme Court. But, it is an individual who starts the 
process. If we take the outstanding case of Brown v Board of Education these were 
individual parents of no particular wealth prominence or political power they just brought 
a lawsuit.   
Researcher:  That is the meaning here, exactly, of public participation in political 
spaces that judges operate.   
Chief Justice:  Right.  It is of course the individual who brings the litigation, 
which is the vehicle by which the court expounds on the constitutional values.  They 
cannot do it in the abstract.  The judiciary provides an alternative to violent resolution of 
disputes--that isn’t just the Supreme Court of the United States, by the very function of 
the judiciary within our states, cities and towns across the nation it provides a peaceful 
resolution of dispute.  Courts cannot create its own litigation it must wait for that 
litigation to be brought before it. 
Researcher:  Yes, and then written judicial opinions can then serve to narrow the 
range of rights violations available to the political branches, before the next emergency. 
Chief Justice: Yes, judicial review serves as a traffic control type of operation. 
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Researcher:  Stop, go, yield--do you think that it was the intention of the 
Founders of the Constitution and Bill of Rights to create those documents to serve a 
strategic function for public participation to preserve the integrity of the Union, to 
provide an outlet for citizens to pursue a peaceable solution where rights were 
concerned? 
Chief Justice:  The Founders in Philadelphia did not create the Bill of Rights in 
1789. Congress proposed a Bill of Rights and in 1791 they were ratified, so when the 
Founders were in Philadelphia they were creating a framework for government and, as 
they say, a more perfect union.  The Bill of Rights came later and they certainly were 
designed to provide a peaceable means for enforcement of the rights of citizens visa vi 
their government.  The drafters of the Bill of Rights certainly James Madison and the 
others, who were active in Congress at the time, had recent experience with a remote 
government in London, which they did not find responsive to recognition of the rights of 
individuals even as those rights were considered by the colonists to be basic rights of 
Englishmen and that led of course to a violent outcome a revolution.  And, our Bill of 
Rights as ratified was designed to limit the power of the national government so that they 
would not repeat the offenses that parliament had created prior to the revolution.  It was a 
limitation on federal power initially later on by interpretation those rights were extended 
to protect individuals against State and Local government as well as the federal 
government, but initially they were designed to protect abuses from the national 
government only--Baron v. Baltimore 1833.  The Bill of Rights is the framework of our 
liberties.   
Researcher:  Would you agree that judicial review operates as a function that 
rests on the Constitutional foundation of shared sovereignty? 
Chief Justice:  I would say that it is the duty of the judiciary to declare the limits 
that other branches of government may not exceed and to protect the rights of the 
individual against the right of government to maintain security, which of course is the 
function of government that is its paramount function to provide security.  A government 
that does not provide security will not last long.  There is of course a tension between the 
principles of democracy and the rule of the majority on the one hand and constitutional 
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imperatives on the other hand.  The Constitution is a limit on the rights of the majority.  It 
is designed to protect minorities from what majorities if uncontrolled determine those 
rights to be.  So there is a tension, however, the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land and even the will of a majority cannot overcome constitutional imperatives.  If it had 
not been for judicial review equal rights would not have been given in the old states of 
the confederacy to African Americans in regard to education voting and other basic rights 
of citizenship.   
Researcher:  Do you think that the willingness on the part of the American 
people to accept the decisions of the judiciary specifically as they accord or address the 
issue of civil liberties-individual rights stems from the ability of the court over many 
many years to instill trust? 
Chief Justice:  --trust in the judiciary itself? 
Researcher:  Yes. 
Chief Justice:  I think the confidence of the American people in the judiciary and 
its willingness to accept the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States can only be 
described as very high.  I think an example is when Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a very 
popular president, came forward with a plan to pack the United States Supreme Court.  
Roosevelt sought to overcome what he regarded as the Court’s resistance to many aspects 
of the New Deal such as the National Recovery Act and some other elements that had 
been designed to help the United States emerge from the great depression.  And, in spite 
of the fact that Roosevelt was elected to four terms of the presidency and was a very 
popular president his plan to pack the Court was opposed by an overwhelming majority 
of popular opinion.  Now that is a long time ago but I think the confidence in the Court 
remains even though people may disagree with a decision or more than one decision.   
Researcher:  I think a more recent example of the confidence or trust that the 




Chief Justice:  Yes, Bush v. Gore.  In many countries that would have led to an 
armed insurrection.  The miracle of the United States is the manner in which the reigns of 
government are peacefully transferred from one administration to another.  The greatest 
military power on earth bows to the popular vote contrast that with Robert Mugabe in 
Zimbabwe who simply will not accept a vote that is not in his favor. 
Researcher:  He would not yield power . . . 
Chief Justice:  He would not yield power and that of course is one example that 
has happened in other places as well.  The constant miracle in the United States is the 
acceptance of a decision either by the people in voting or by the courts.  The opinion may 
redound to the great disadvantage of the person against who it is issued, for example 
president Nixon when he was forced to turn over the tapes he knew that would lead to his 
political ruin.  Yet he probably never considered physically opposing it even though he 
was commander-in-chief of the army, the navy, the air force.  He was the one who 
appointed all the federal marshals who would enforce the decision and yet he obeyed it 
even though he knew it would result in his political, how would one say, ruin.   
Researcher:  Do you agree that non-judicial institutions like the United States 
Senate should perform judicial review? 
Chief Justice:  I would not agree that that is a good idea.  I have great respect for 
the United States Senate.  As you well know, of course the United States is made up of 
many lawyers.  You need not be a lawyer to be a United States senator and there are 
many non-professionals non-lawyers in the Senate.  Even though members of the Senate, 
who happen to be lawyers, are primarily interested in the political process as opposed to 
the determination of purely legal rights as they might be, if they were practicing their 
profession elsewhere… Whereas in the Senate they are entirely devoted to let us say 
balancing competing interests and legislating for the benefit of their constituents and that 
is for the benefit of the country, but they are making law rather than declaring what the 
law is.  I believe that declaring what the law is, is a matter that requires complete 
professional dedication and requires independence of judgment not thinking of 
constituents looking over ones’ shoulder and worrying about re-election.  I think the 
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Founders were enormously wise in creating a judiciary that was not subject to the 
electoral process.  One of the best examples of the lack of judicial review that I can give 
you is the Reichstag in Germany 1933.  The Reichstag was not subject to any judicial 
review.  Whatever the Reichstag voted was the law of Germany and you know what the 
Reichstag did.  It established a dictatorship that was; I suppose you might say, was one of 
the horrible examples of tyranny, terrorism, and despotism. Yet within the German 
framework, it was completely legal.  Adolph Hitler was a legalist.  Within the framework 
of the German system, which gave the Reichstag complete power all he had to do was to 
dominate the Reichstag and he did.  The Reichstag gave him the Power of Chancellor and 
ultimately the power the complete power of the German state.  And, what was missing, 
judicial review.  There was no judicial review in Germany.  There is now, but there 
wasn’t then.  That is the best example I can think of for the absence of judicial review. 
Researcher:  Would you say, this provides a good example of why the United 
States must continue to have judicial review, particularly during the GWOT. 
Chief Justice:  Yes indeed, yes indeed, because you cannot depend even on an 
intelligent legislature.  I don’t think that one can pretend that the Germans were not 
educated and intelligent people, they were.  Members of the Reichstag probably would 
compare favorably intelligence wise with members of any legislature at any time or place 
excepting as they balance what they determined to be the competing interest they made a 
terrible decision, which plunged not only Germany but also the world into one might say 
abysmal conditions for decades. 
Researcher:  Would you say judicial review performed by an independent 
judiciary fosters despotism. 
Chief Justice:  I would say it does not.  I would say that it strengthens American 
democracy by limiting the role of government and preventing government from 
overstepping its bounds even for what it may consider to be a benign purpose.  Going 
back to our German example, the Reichstag was weighing competing interests:  terrible 
economic conditions in Germany the limitations of the treaty of Versailles, inflation, loss 
of territory, loss of prestige and in balancing these competing interests they gave power 
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to a despot who would restore their national pride.  I would say that in 5000 years of 
recorded history the average person has frequently traded liberty for despotism in order to 
avoid what he or she would consider anarchy.  The one state people would not accept is 
anarchy.  They would take tyranny every time and after some experience with tyranny 
they would try to break out of it, but much of human history on earth is a history of 
despotism to create security.  There is a longing for security and the man on the white 
horse is always promising security enforced often by the sword.  We see that happening, 
at the moment.  One of the recent decisions, Boumediene v. Bush concerning the 
Guantanamo detainees was an example of limiting the power of the executive and 
limiting the power of the legislature.  During the war, during the civil war the Supreme 
Court of the United States did not wrestle with that question until after the war was over. 
The right of habeas corpus was gravely limited during the civil war.  Secretary of War, 
Stanton jailed editors and many many individuals, citizens, during the period and the 
Court did not declare these acts unconstitutional until after the war was over.  That was 
Ex parte Milligan. 
Researcher:  Perhaps the Court’s opinion in Boumediene v. Bush would have 
been different, if the GWOT was actually taking place on American soil. 
Chief Justice:  There is no question that during the civil war the turmoil and the 
strife were very close to the seat of government.  Washington was just across the 
Potomac from Virginia, which, you might say, was the heartland of the Confederacy.  
However, Alabama might claim to be the heartland—Virginia was very very much a part 
of the Confederacy and the home of the army much of the time just across the Potomac.  
Maryland, Baltimore on the other side was a hotbed of secessionist feelings even though 
Maryland did not secede.  So hostile forces surrounded the government, and of course, 
that explains why President Lincoln acted so forcefully.  He definitely felt threatened and 
the members of his cabinet felt threatened as well--actually, physically threatened.  
Nevertheless, I say that the Supreme Court is willing to deal with these problems while 
the Supreme Court during the civil war may not have felt it was able to deal with those 
problems.  You might say, amid the clash of arms, the law is silent. 
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Researcher:  Well, I suppose, today, judicial review is essential to preventing an 
appeal to the sword and dissolution of the compact. 
Chief Justice:  I do believe so. 
Researcher:  Do you agree that judicial review encourages cooperation between 
judges and political leaders to obtain common objectives. 
Chief Justice:  I do agree.  They don’t cooperate in the active sense of working 
together or conferring together, but I believe that the judiciary exercises deference to the 
power of the legislature to determine what is necessary for the public welfare.  I think 
their review of legislative action is deferential particularly where economics are at issue, 
but less deferential in matters of civil liberties.   
Researcher:  Critics of judicial review suggest that judges lack incentives and are 
therefore ill suited to balance competing interests.   
Chief Justice:  I believe that the incentive of the judge is to enunciate the law.  I 
think that is the best incentive one could have in determining constitutional issues.  I 
recognize that the judiciary is not a legislative body, and the work of a legislative body is 
precisely to balance competing interests.  The miracle is that the legislature balances 
them as well as they do because they are constantly being subject to barrages of dire 
predictions of total doom, if they do one thing rather than another.  Still they must 
balance competing interests.  They must balance these.  But, I think the sole incentive of 
the judiciary is to enunciate the law and to declare what the law is--to declare what the 
law is as John Marshal said back in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, I think is the source of 
their strength rather than a source of their weakness.   
Researcher:  Does judicial review ever constitute making law, then?   
Chief Justice:  The judiciary is limited to serving one case at a time so it doesn’t 
have the legislative outreach that normally we associate with Congress.  There are 
inherent limitations on the courts power, it would strongly maintain that it has no right to 
legislate, only tell you what the law is, not what it ought to be.  Nevertheless, the Court 
has done some legislating—Miranda was a perfect example of judicial legislation when 
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the Court not only gave the rights, but specifically enunciated what those rights would be 
and exactly what the police had to do.  Taking all of these things together I would say 
that the court is and has been conflicted about its role.  It does not want to legislate.  It 
wants to declare what the law is.  It wishes to limit its function.  It does not want to 
expand its function, but there are times that the court is forced into expanding its 
function, in order to create a legal concept that is workable. This is why when the court 
got into the area of segregation it got into activities such as appointing masters to run 
school systems.  The court did this with reluctance and was eager to get out of that 
activity as soon as it could.  The court desires to limit its activity and its power, but is 
often forced into exercising the power to achieve a result that must be obtained.  Even 
though it does so reluctantly and of course it always has to be impelled by somebody who 
brings the litigation, somebody that comes before the court with a case or controversy 
that presents the issue and ultimately the court will decide that issue.  If it was not for the 
person who bought the case it would never be decided. 
Researcher:  Well it is a wonderfully strategically effective system. 
Chief Justice:  Well, I think it is.  I think it is a wonderful system.  I think it is an 
extra-ordinarily effective system.  Even though sometimes it has to be dragged into the 
controversy and I am sure as somebody who has been a judge for 52 years it may be the 
last thing in the world that you want to do is go in and decide this case in this 
tremendously controversial matter, but when it comes before the court it must be decided.  
And, that is the one thing in which the court differs from all other branches of 
government when a case in controversy is brought before the court within its jurisdiction 
it must decide it.  It can’t do what Congress can do.  Congress can say well we won’t 
consider it right now we will wait until next year we will assign it to a commission or we 
won’t bring it to a vote.  But, the court must decide.  That is a significant feature of the 
court that the other branches do not have. 
Researcher:  Are there any specific processes or procedures in criminal or 
Constitutional law that should be modified as a result of the GWOT? 
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Chief Justice:  I would not advocate any modification of any of our 
Constitutional principles in the sense of re-codifying or amending them on an ad hoc 
basis.  Law enforcement personnel homeland security personnel may have to take 
whatever actions are necessary to protect against catastrophic disaster.  For example, if 
we have a report or probable cause to believe someone has poured a toxic poison into the 
reservoir, we may need to take action that goes beyond the hope of prosecuting such an 
individual.  We may have to take action to try to find out the source of this toxic poison 
and to take whatever action that is necessary to remediate the disaster that might occur.  
Under such circumstances it may be that the Miranda limitations might have to be 
somewhat diminished in order to find out what we need even though that may have an 
affect upon prosecution.  Prosecution might not be the ultimate goal in that situation but 
responding to the catastrophe and trying to remediate as much as possible the disaster that 
would result. 
5. Questions 20 and 21 
Q20: Modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001, terror attacks requires the 
modification of the ordinary processes of criminal law and procedure. 
Q21: Modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001, terror attacks requires the 
modification of the ordinary processes of Constitutional law. 
 
















Figure 5.   Supremes’ responses to questions 20 and 21.  
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Researcher:  Has the GWOT expanded the conventional definition of war? 
Chief Justice:  In the opinion of the Bush administration, we are engaged in 
sustained crises.  We are engaged in a real occupation task in Iraq, and we are engaged in 
another occupation-war in Afghanistan as well as in a situation of confrontation with 
Iran, so yes we are, we are without question in a very difficult international situation, but 
no more difficult then the so-called Cold War was.  It was a sustained thing from the end 
of World War II to 1989 when the wall came down and the Soviet Union began to 
dissolve--from 1944 to 1989, 45 years.  There are those who would argue that that was a 
War on Communism.  But, the term GWOT is a term that is somewhat difficult to define.  
The United States has been the victim of terror carried out by extremist organizations 
which we refer to as al Qaeda, and al Qaeda and other extremist organizations are 
dedicated to a program of terror and acts of terror against the United States of America, 
its citizens and its institutions.  Now, luckily, we havent’ had any recently, but in the past 
as you know, we have had attacks on the World Trade Center, we have had attacks at 
American embassies in Africa, we have had attacks on the naval war ship the USS Cole. 
And undoubtedly we might anticipate that there might be further attacks, wherever we are 
deemed to be vulnerable.  And in spite of the best efforts at security, no nation, no person 
no institution is ever impregnable or invulnerable to a determined attack by a person or 
persons who are willing to give their lives in order to carry forth the attack. 
6. Question 19  
Q19: Modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, expanded the 











Figure 6.   Supremes’ responses to question 19. 
Researcher:  Under the GWOT paradigm, the terror threat is seemingly 
perpetual. 
Chief Justice:  At least the future of this activity can be perhaps best described as 
indefinite I do not know what we could do or refrain from doing that might cause these 
attacks no longer to take place.  Because certainly on 9/11 we were not in Iraq, we were 
not in Afghanistan we had very little activity globally going on in terms of our armed 
forces being in place.  We were perhaps criticized or subject to criticism by some nations 
in the Middle East because of a purported support for the state of Israel.  We certainly 
might have been vilified for that but generally speaking our activities in the area certainly 
the Middle East were limited at the time we had these attacks carried out against us.  We 
are much more involved now, and actually the attacks since we have been involved 
mercifully have not occurred in our homeland but that does not mean that they will not. 
Researcher:  Balancing civil liberties—making those determinations, when faced 
with an indefinite GWOT . . . when are we are at peace, as opposed to war?  It gets 
murky and complicated under the GWOT paradigm. 
Chief Justice: --very blurred.  By many definitions we are not at war, at the 
present time, in the sense when we were at war with the empire of Japan, Germany and 
Italy during World War II, of course we were never at war with the Soviet Union.  But 
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we were always on the brink of conflict we were in danger of conflict and at the present 
time there is no likelihood of any foreign power currently that seeks to establish 
sovereignty over us to overthrow our government and to conquer the United States.  
What these terrorists are attempting to do is to create chaos in various places throughout 
the world and what their ultimate goal is, is not very clear--what their ultimate goal is not 
clear.  Do they wish to take over Iraq I am not even sure of that--I am not even sure of 
that?  You have a Shiite government in Iraq.  Presently the Shiite clerics also govern Iran, 
which is the neighboring government that might possibly seek to have more influence in 
Iraq, if we were to leave.  The Sunnis in Iraq are in the minority but they did pretty much 
run the government under Saddam.  Most Muslims are Sunnis throughout the world, 
Shiites are a minority though they form the majority in Iraq and they form the majority in 
Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia are Sunni.  I don’t know what the objective of al Qaeda 
could be, it may have had at one time some desire to restore Sunni dominance in Iraq 
whether it maintains that desire I do not know Osama Bin Laden is not exactly articulate 
in expounding upon his vision of what the government of Iraq should be.  He certainly 
expounds on the fact that the United States is terrible, and the great Satan, and that the 
Iraqi government is ineffective and illegitimate.  But he is a tearer down rather than a 
builder up.  And I don’t know what his vision is of an Iraq that he would like to be--I 
don’t know that and I don’t know that anybody else does.  But there are builders and 
there are destroyers, and I think that Osama Bin Laden is a destroyer. 
Researcher:  --for the sake of destroying 
Chief Justice:  --right, he might have some ideas of an Islamic state he wishes to 
purge the state of secular influences particularly influences coming from the West.  I 
think he would like a clerical state in Iraq.  Of course, he isn’t even an Iraqi.  He comes 
from Saudi Arabia and I think he has very grave disagreements with the government of 
Saudi Arabia and the fashion with which they conduct themselves.  He is sort of an 
Islamic purist and is very much against any Western influence.  He is against secular 




drinking alcohol and I suppose inappropriate conduct by both men and women so he is 
sort of a puritanical man of mystery.  And what is the objective of al Qaeda at the present 
time other than to create chaos, is not clear. 
Researcher:  Perhaps there are some advantages to not knowing.  It can temper 
United States response to the release of Osama Bin Laden video tapes--whether we 
increase the threat level.  In other words, each time Osama Bin Laden or al Qaeda does 
something short of an actual attack should not necessarily require our government to 
respond in any significant way.  Over response can have the effect of individuals not 
taking risks or threats seriously because of continued warnings or fear mongering.  Over 
response, can threaten normalcy if we don’t temper our responses to terrorism then 
incrementally Osama Bin Laden would create chaos. 
Chief Justice:  If he can drive us into a panic he has succeeded and we can panic 
in various ways.  We can panic by, let us say, violating civil liberties on a broad scale.  
We can panic by brutality.  We can panic by our activities in regard to other nations, our 
methods in dealing with people in Iraq, our methods in dealing with people in 
Afghanistan in all of these areas our conduct, if we panic in response to al Qaeda or 
Osama Bin Laden he has achieved his objective.  Because I don’t think he wants to 
conquer the U.S., I don’t think he would even expect to do so he probably wants to drive 
us out of pretty much the Islamic world.  He would like us to leave even Saudi Arabia 
where we do have people--some bases there, and I think he would like us to leave Iraq 
and he would probably like us to leave Afghanistan.  I think that would be his objective.  
Researcher:  Do you think some of the United States responses to 9/11 were to 
address the psychological impact of the event.  Al Qaeda doesn’t appear to possess the 
ability to take over America or Iraq. 
Chief Justice:  I think that is true.  What al Qaeda can do is establish, is to create 
chaotic conditions.  If they were to have a series of attacks right now, for example it is 
very unlikely that al Qaeda can take over the government of Iraq.  But they can make that 
government, let us say, ineffective by constantly creating furor, chaos--by making 
markets unavailable, blowing up oil transportation lines, doing things to make the 
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economy in turmoil.  So they are not one, an organization that seeks to take over the 
government, but only to create chaos--to make the government ineffective.  What that 
would lead too is very difficult to predict.  If you were going to take over or another 
country was to take over Iraq, it would probably be Iran or somebody moving in to end 
the chaos.  For one thing, that human beings will not abide for a long time is chaos.  They 
will accept tyranny rather than anarchy and have done so throughout history.   
Researcher:  Part of America’s challenge, then, in creating a culture of security is 
to deal with the psychological aspects of terrorism and the threat of terror. 
Chief Justice:  Indeed, enormously important, in this area perception becomes 
reality.  A government cannot be effective unless it is perceived to be effective.  And, a 
threat to the effectiveness of government is a threat to government itself, very definitely.  
I think we have to recognize that the emphasis on security comes from the most basic of 
human instincts—self—preservation.  Security and self-preservation are closely related 
and very few human beings wish to give up security they also value their liberties and 
they want to retain them sometimes they forget about the liberty of somebody else who 
is, in their opinion, threatening their security.  Therefore, they are willing to compromise 
the liberty of some body else, they consider to be a danger to them without realizing that 
when they take away the liberty of someone else they are endangering their own liberty.  
We cannot say that the liberties of someone else are irrelevant to us because they are all 
relevant.  Sometimes we may forget.  As when we imprisoned thousands of Japanese, the 
attorney general of the state of California at that time was Earl Warren who later became 
one of the greatest of all civil libertarians.  At that time, he was not opposed to 
imprisoning the Japanese, because he regarded them as a threat and we were in a panic 
following the attack of December 7, 1941.  I was in the Navy at the time and I remember 
the, how would one say, the outpouring of indignation and fear because many believed 
that the attack would be followed up by an invasion of California.  This of course is why 
they decided that the Japanese people who turned out to be completely inoffensive--there 




World War II, but the fear existed it was the perception and self-preservation, the concept 
of self-preservation that caused Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue that order.  And many 
Californians, in fact, most Californians were very much in sympathy. 
7. Questions 15 and 16 
Q15: There is value in permitting indefinite detention of U.S. citizens suspected 
of terrorism without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
suspect really is a terrorist. 
Q16: There is value in indefinite detention of U.S. citizens suspected of 
terrorism so long as there is a persuasive showing before a judge in an 
adversary hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist. 
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Figure 7.   Supremes’ responses to questions 15 and 16. 
8. Questions 17 and 18 
Q17: There is value in permitting indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens 
suspected of terrorism so long as there is a persuasive showing before a 
judge in an adversary hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist. 
Q18: There is value in permitting indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens 
suspected of terrorism without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the suspect really is a terrorist. 
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Figure 8.   Supremes’ responses to questions 17 and 18. 
Researcher:  Do you think that because the line of interment cases have not in 
fact been overruled and since some homeland security policies appear to allow racial or 
ethnic profiling, we could have a reoccurrence? 
Chief Justice:  We could, we could . . . 
Researcher:  An executive order for detention based on race or ethnicity goes 
beyond using race or ethnicity for investigative purposes.  It is law versus policy--so a 
consideration of equal protection . . . 
Chief Justice:  The obligation of government is to prove there is a reason for 
detention and to do it not because of racial profiling, ethnic profiling, or overriding belief 
that anyone that might be termed a Muslim is an infiltrator.  You may need racial 
profiling to begin an investigation.  It may be a factor that leads a law enforcement 
authority to investigate.  But it is not and never should be a reason for imprisonment or 
detention.  You investigate.  And, then you get probable cause to believe that a person is 
an enemy or is an insurgent or is a terrorist.  Then of course you take whatever measures 
are necessary to protect the community.  While racial profiling may be a factor in the 
beginning of the investigation, it should not be the end of the investigation.  Punishment 
based on race or ethnicity is absolutely unacceptable. 
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9. Question 22  
Q22: A response to modern terrorism—September 11, 2001 terror attacks 













Figure 9.   Supremes’ responses to question 22. 
Researcher:  It would behoove states to ensure their policies address the use of 
race and ethnicity before the next attack.   
Chief Justice:  I agree.  We must draw a distinction between circumstances that 
justify suspicion as opposed to circumstances that justify detention.  Surveillance based 
upon suspicion may very well be justified.  Detention would require something more than 
mere suspicion.  And, then, of course, we have that other level reasonable suspicion that 
might cause you to confront the individual and talk to the individual and of course after 
that discussion you might go to another level.  But I think that the kind of generality that 
may cause us to become suspicious is not sufficient for us to detain that individual, it may 
be sufficient to take the next step of surveillance or even questioning but not detention. 
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10. Questions 26 and 27 
Q26: A response to modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001 terror attacks 
can require as a matter of policy clandestine surveillance of non-U.S. 
citizens. 
Q27: A response to modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001 terror attacks 
can require clandestine surveillance of U.S. citizens only as a matter of 
law. 
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Figure 10.   Supremes’ responses to questions 26 and 27. 
Researcher:  It is a question of what factors go into allowing one to be held 
permissibly or legally detained . . . 
Chief Justice:  We do have the standard of probable cause.  And I think that is 
the standard that should be maintained to the extent that we can do so.  That is the 
standard that has withstood centuries of time.  And I believe that valuing individual 
liberty can still be maintained while we spend a great deal of time and effort on 
guaranteeing the security of our nation and our community and our people.  Because 
without security there can be no freedom and without freedom security becomes tyranny.  
Just one little story there is a case called Entic v. Carrington in which the agents of 
George the III were sued for having broken up a small newspaper.  The perpetuators were 
sued for trespass.  Lord Camden presided, found the agents of the king were guilty of 
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trespass, and awarded damages.  Now, had there been a Lord Camden in the Colonies 
there might not have been a revolution.  Lord Camden exercised his judicial power even 
against the agents of the king in England, but there was no lord Camden in the Colonies 
but it has sometimes been suggested that if there were a lord Camden in the Colonies 
there might not have been a revolution and the Colonies might have remained part of the 
British Empire, so, that in someway the respect for liberty and the rights of the individual 
can preserve the state. 
Researcher:  That speaks to a cost benefit analysis, what is the cost to the state or 
to our system of government by implementing certain public safety and security measures 
balanced against the benefit.  What is the benefit to liberty? 
Chief Justice:  Constantly, we must balance those liberties, we have been doing it 
for more than 200 years, and I think we should continue to do it to the best of our ability.  
The story of Lord Camden is telling regarding the role the judiciary in balancing civil 
liberties.  The judiciary has an enormous role.  The judiciary is the guardian of the 
individual liberty, as well as being, of course, the guardian of the security of the 
community.  It has both roles, but the judiciary is perhaps more oriented toward judicial 
liberty than the executive branch.  I will not say more than the legislative branch, but the 
executive branch, which tends to be more authoritarian in its approach. 
Researcher:  Why is that do you think? 
Chief Justice:  Because the executive must get things done and when you want to 
get things done, you want your commands to be obeyed  
Researcher:  And ask forgiveness later. 
Chief Justice:  Every governor wants to be a CEO and is disappointed when he 
cannot react like a CEO.  The commanding officer wants to be obeyed.  The commander 
in chief wants to be obeyed.  The judge, of course, wants to be obeyed too, but after a 
series of safeguards is adhered to. 
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Researcher:  Some scholars argue an order suspending or curtailing civil liberties 
should only take place during more clearly defined national emergencies as opposed to 
the GWOT. 
Chief Justice:  That is the traditional view.  The Constitution itself sets forth that 
a right of habeas corpus can only be suspended in case of rebellion, national emergency, 
invasion, and yes the general idea is that civil liberties of which habeas corpus is one, 
would only be curtailed when absolutely necessary and not as a routine matter.  In 
general we look, we should look with great repugnance at curtailment of civil liberties, 
and [curtail civil liberties], only to the extent, that curtailment is absolutely essential. 
11. Questions 4 and 5 
Q4: During times of national emergencies, civil liberties should yield in favor 
of public safety/security measures. 
Q5: During times of national emergencies, civil liberties must yield in favor of 





















Researcher:  It is challenging to make those determinations facing an indefinite 
GWOT, and where the terror alert system has been raised since 9/11. 
Chief Justice:  We have an example of course of the constant fear of acts of 
terrorism best illustrated by our going into an airport and being searched.  Taking off our 
shoes, perhaps our belts, and other accouterments, we are limited to what we can carry 
abroad a plane, limited as to what we can have on our person.  These limitations have 
existed for a quite a long time and they are not likely to diminish in the future.  They are 
certainly matters of great inconvenience, but I believe that most citizens of the United 
States and most people visiting the United States are willing to undergo these restrictions 
on our right to be left alone . . . in hopes for the resulting safety and lack of fear that 
might otherwise not exist if we were not subjected to those restrictions.  Even though 
each of us feels that, he or she is not likely to commit any act of terrorism.  Certainly 
[there is] no idea in my mind to commit any act of terrorism, but I am willing to undergo 
these searches as a part of a general system to prevent acts of terrorism from occurring . . 
. . I suppose I would have to describe it [preserving liberty] as a delicate balance.  We are 
willing to accept some limitations on our civil liberties, our right to be left alone as I 
think it has been described in order to achieve as much of a degree of safety as we can.  
But for the same reason, presumably, there are some limitations on what we would be 
willing to accept, and there are also limitations--a cost benefit analysis of various means 
of national security or local state security.  You have perhaps on either side extremists 
some extremist would not wish to have any liberty impairments; on the other hand, some 
extremist in the law enforcement area would want to overcome all liberties.  Both 
extremists, let us say, are supporting a position that would be illogical, extreme and 
undoubtedly unsuccessful.  If you suspend all liberties, you would still not achieve 
security.  If you interfered with utterly--utterly no liberties, you might very well be 
inviting acts of terrorism that otherwise would not occur--such as our airport check, such 
as hopefully checks on cargo coming into the U.S. to look for nuclear materials matters 
of this kind.  We have to realize that a man with a brief case could hold a nuclear 
weapon, if we say that you can never look in a suitcase, and we fail to expose the suitcase 
containing the nuclear weapon we might very well have overlooked the opportunity to 
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prevent that occurrence.  So, it is constantly a balance, and extremes on both sides should 
be avoided, we should take a rational hopefully intelligent point of view to maintain civil 
liberties to the greatest extent that we can and at the same time provide as much 
protection against possible acts of terrorism we can achieve in a free society. 
12. Question 8  












Figure 12.   Supremes’ responses to question 8. 
Researcher:  It is a social experiment, the balancing that is required it would 
seem we would have to allow some safety and security measures to be implemented and 
to give them time to see the results because the consequences of not taking the actions in 
the first instance would be far too great. 
Chief Justice:  I believe that is true, I believe that is true.  Security for its own 
sake is perhaps as dangerous as no security at all.  We have to make sure that there is a 
good fit a good connect between the security measures and the danger to be apprehended.  
And I suppose for example even in our airport security checks having octogenarian 
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grandmothers take off their sneakers may be of very little help in protecting us against 
violence even though, some security analysis would probably say it has some.  Again, it 
is this delicate balance and you have to use an intelligent cost benefit analysis in 
determining what measures--security measures should be permitted and what measures 
should not be permitted. 
13. Question 3  
Q3: An essential element to consider when balancing the competing interests 
of civil liberties and public safety/security measures during times of 
national emergencies is whether sufficient time has passed to determine 











Figure 13.   Supremes’ responses to question 3. 
Researcher:  So the goal is to implement public safety security measures that are 
successful, but not unnecessarily harmful to the liberty interests. 
Chief Justice:  To the extent possible, yes.  We should protect the liberties to the 
greatest extent that our national security will permit and we should diminish those 
liberties only where absolutely essential to our security and not on an arbitrary basis.  
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Because through much of the history of humankind liberty has been sacrificed to security.  
In medieval times, the Lord of the Manor was permitted to demand the most outrageous 
obedience from his serfs and retainers in return for protection.  Much of the history of 
humankind has been the acceptance of tyranny in order to avoid chaos, in order to avoid 
attacks both domestic and foreign and it is only really in the last two centuries that 
humankind has emerged from a general aura of tyranny.  In 1787 when our Constitution 
was promulgated tyrants ruled nearly all the world.  They may have been benevolent 
despots but they were despots nonetheless.  The Habsburgs, Romanovs, ruled much of 
the western world.  The Ottomans ruled pretty much all the Islamic world at the time that 
our Constitution was adapted, so tyranny was the order of the day and this was why many 
people who were thoughtful did not believe that the American experiment would 
succeed.  Fortunately, it did and we have succeeded for two centuries in being a model to 
the world for freedom and security.  We have to try to retain that model and fight for its 
continued existence and we must support obviously, what is necessary for that continued 
existence, but the continued existence in the form that we have known not abandoning 
the form if we can possibly avoid, in fact we must not abandon that form. 
14. Question 2  
Q2: An essential element to consider when balancing the competing interests 
of civil liberties and public safety/security measures during times of 
national emergencies is whether alternative less harmful (to liberty) 









Figure 14.   Supremes’ responses to question 2. 
Researcher:  Public safety and security measures should then serve a dual role in 
that they protect against terror but must preserve civil liberties; is that the message 
America should send to the world. 
Chief Justice:  I would certainly hope that the security measures would do both. I 
would hope that they would do both and that should be the objective of all who are in 
charge of that aspect of our society and government. 
15. Questions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 
There is value in conferring constitutional rights on: 
Q9:  Known terrorists 
Q10:  Known terrorists only if they are citizens of the U.S. 
Q11:  Suspected terrorists 
Q12:  Suspected terrorists only if they are citizens of the U.S. 
Q13:  Suspected terrorists only to protect the innocent 
Q14:  Known terrorists only to protect the innocent 
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Figure 15.   Supremes’ views on questions 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14. 
Researcher:  Has GWOT blurred lines between HLDS and national security?   
Chief Justice:  There is always a tension between civil liberties and national 
security in the context of violence and/or war.  That tension was perhaps most amply 
illustrated by our own civil war of 1861 to 1865.  No lesser person than Abraham Lincoln 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.  In ex parte Milligan after the war was over, the 
court decided President Lincoln had acted illegally that he did not have the power to 
suspend the Writ of habeas corpus.  Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United 
States has determined that the detainees in Guantanamo are entitled to the privilege of the 
Writ.  Habeas corpus even though purportedly suspended by Congress has been 
determined to be still operative even in the Guantanamo base, which is in a sense under 
the sovereignty of Cuba though we have de facto control of that area, and habeas corpus 
will run there.  Now this tension will continue to exist, but if a person were to come 
before a state or federal court, I believe that that person would be entitled to the 
guarantees which the constitutions give of right to counsel, fair trial, to be tried in 
accordance with the principles of the common laws as well as the principles of our state 
and federal constitutions.  There might be some difficulty in regard to classified 
information that would have to be determined on an ad hoc basis.  But generally speaking 
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not even the United States Supreme Court has tackled that question about classified 
information, except to refer to its most recent case, but to the extent that it would be 
possible to do so, the rights that attach to an individual in respect to being tried for a 
crime of which he or she is accused would have to be given maximum protection as the 
Constitution requires.  National security may require certain limitations on the release of 
classified information.  Then the court would have to try to balance those necessities as 
fairly as possible. 
Researcher:  Should a state judiciary routinely read intelligence reports? 
Chief Justice:  For the most part the state judiciary would probably not be 
involved with federal intelligence reports.  Because they would not generally become an 
issue in a state proceeding, but to the extent that they might and to the extent that these 
reports would be available to the state courts and to the extent that they would be relevant 
to the case at issue I would think that the court would have to read that report in camera 
to determine whether that report would become part of the public record.  This happens 
more frequently in the federal courts. 
Researcher:  What is your understanding of coercive interrogation techniques? 
Chief Justice:  Well, I suppose that to define it, one would say that a coercive 
interrogation technique would be a technique, which is designed to obtain information 
through the use of force or the threat of force, or torture or the threat of torture and that it 
is a form of interrogation that has been widely used throughout the history of mankind, 
but which has generally been discouraged in the United States since 1966, since the 
Miranda decision. 
16. Questions 23, 24 and 25 
Q23: Coercive interrogation techniques do not constitute punishment during 
times of national emergencies. 
Q24: There is value in permitting coercive interrogation techniques during 
times of national emergencies only when the value of information sought 
is great. 
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Q25: Coercive interrogation techniques during times of national emergencies 
do not constitute punishment only when no other method would work 
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Figure 16.   Supremes’ responses to questions 23, 24 and 25. 
Researcher:  Do you think there is a difference between using coercive 
interrogation techniques under the umbrella of national security as opposed to homeland 
defense and security?   
Chief Justice:  Well I think there is a difference between using coercive 
techniques to avoid catastrophic disaster.  As I mentioned to you, simply attempting to 
build a case for prosecution under the criminal law is different, I think that if we are 
dealing with attempts to avoid catastrophic disaster we may have to relax some of the 
limitations on law enforcement personnel for survival.   
Researcher:  Intelligence is needed on the state and federal level. 
Chief Justice:  In order to respond to threats to national security intelligence is a 
vital element, we cannot defend ourselves without intelligence whether it is against a 
foreign threat or a domestic threat, if we are unable to gather intelligence we are in a 
sense fighting blindly and fighting blindly is equivalent perhaps to not fighting at all.  
Therefore, the gathering of intelligence both foreign and domestic is essential to the 
security of the nation.  The methods of gathering that intelligence are of course subject to 
some restraint.  Including the fourth and fifth amendments, but consistent with those 
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restraints I would think it appropriate for both the national government and state police 
organizations to gather all the intelligence that they possibly can in a legal manner that 
would tend to protect the state and the nation against violent terrorism and illegal actions.  
Somebody I think it was Justice Jackson mentioned the Bill of Rights is not a common 
suicide pact.  We must protect ourselves.  We must preserve ourselves.  But in doing so 
we must go no further than the catastrophe requires.  We cannot use these techniques 
capaciously, arbitrarily but only when they are absolutely necessary to our survival.  The 
fact that we were champions of individual liberty, individual freedom and that we 
extended those freedoms to even aliens in our midst and to aliens who came under our 
control.  Now of course from time to time we deviated from that high moral status when 
we imprisoned the Japanese during World War II, thousands of Japanese were 
imprisoned without any basis other than ethnic or racial origin.  We departed from those 
principles, certainly recently detaining people without proving that they are enemy 
combatants and where we do not have reasonable or probable cause to believe that they 
are enemy combatants.   
17. Question 30  
Please check the most important factor(s) that you believe are necessary to 
consider when determining whether to grant a habeas petition of a suspected 
terrorist detainee during times of national emergency 
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Figure 17.   Supremes’ responses to question 30. 
But, generally speaking throughout World War I, World War II and the Cold War, 
in spite of aberrations from time to time, we emerged from those terrible conflicts with 
our institutions still strong our institutions still respected and to a great extent admired by 
the rest of the world, at least by thoughtful members of the rest of the world.  It is very 
important for us to retain that moral leadership.  What we must do is to retain the basic 
respect for human liberty and human rights that are essential to our system of government 
because if we lose that focus, that compass, then, of course, the terrorists have succeeded 
and we are no longer the country that we wish to protect.   
July, August, October 2008 
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V. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As America and her allies attempt to secure against the incomprehensible: 
terrorism, they must call on the collective resources of their people and institutions to 
wage a war of winning ideas, ideas that will not compromise or undermine her 
democratic principles but rather ideas that embody a contextualized freedom that respects 
human dignity.   
This thesis has sought the addition of ideas on what factors are essential to 
consider when balancing competing interests, public safety/security measures and civil 
liberties during the global war on terror.  It has done so, in part, by inviting the reader to 
reason critically to ground their Socratic questioning in empirical data directly from 
judicial officers of constitutional courts, State Supreme Court Justices.  It has also sought 
to add to the myriad of voices calling to transcend the debate about whether judicial 
review is unnecessary, and democratically illegitimate as well as a debate that led the 
researcher to identify three hypotheses to guide the reader’s critical assessment on 
whether or how judicial review is material and relevant to democracy’s quest to reduce 
terrorism, and to provide the researcher’s concluding thoughts.   
In short, the hypotheses evoke thought on whether a constitutional court’s power 
to exercise judicial review is democratically illegitimate as charged, because it precludes 
public participation in governing through elected representatives. In addition, they ponder 
whether judicial review serves a vitally important strategic function of coordinating 
peaceable public participation in a democracy, and finally, whether judicial review 
performed by an independent judiciary promotes a contextualized democracy that 
enhances a sovereign’s legitimacy and can serve to reduce terrorism. 
In this conclusion, the researcher seeks to highlight that because judicial review 
offers an alternative to the sword, it is material and relevant to democracy’s quest to 
reduce terrorism.  Judicial review and the views of the Supremes can serve as a model for 
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regions testing liberalization, regions known not for where terrorist strike, but from where 
terrorist activity originates,155 of key factors to consider when balancing liberty and 
security interests to preserve both individual freedoms and a sovereign’s legitimacy.   
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND REDUCING TERRORISM 
1. Counter-majoritarianism Hypothesis 
Judicial review inveighs against popular constitutionalism (e.g., it 
precludes public participation in creating constitutional law through action 
in politics) by voiding political branch action.  Hence, judicial review is 
illegitimate, irrelevant and immaterial to democracy’s quest to reduce 
terrorism. 
A constitutional court’s power to exercise judicial review is democratically 
illegitimate because it precludes public participation in governing through elected 
representatives and is therefore irrelevant and immaterial to democracy’s quest to 
reduce terrorism.  There are differences among non-judicial review theorists but one 
shared belief is that judicial review is dangerous in a representative democracy.  They 
believe judicial review constitutes an illegitimate power-grab.  A power-grab that 
alienates the public from its government by seizing responsibility for protecting rights 
away from duly elected executive and legislative representatives and transferring it to 
unaccountable judges.156  Non-judicial review theorists question the necessity, 
legitimacy, and competency of judicial review.  Alleging judges cannot exercise the 
considered constitutional judgment necessary to balance competing interests because the 
Constitution provides no process,157 or because judges lack incentives,158 and in a 
functioning democracy, judicial review is an “insulting form of disenfranchisement and a 
legalistic obfuscation of the moral issues at stake in our disagreements about rights.”159   
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That said, non-judicial review theorists, Waldron, Tushnet, Yoo, and Hirschl, 
however, do not disavow the historic value and power judicial review has had as a 
legitimate function for sustaining America’s democracy.  Instead, they seek to diminish 
or foreclose the power of judges to exercise judicial review when they assert repeatedly 
that judges behave illegitimately when they perform judicial review and by asking 
repeatedly if judicial review is really necessary.  Both knowledge and wisdom has gone 
into their arguments, but their arguments appear grounded in resentment of judicial 
power and unfortunately constitute an unnecessary distraction that directs attention away 
from much needed scholarly discourse of how an independent judiciary is material and 
relevant to democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism.   
What is more, similar to “the confusion surrounding the topic of leaders and 
leadership,”160 which arises from a focus on “assumptions around ‘position and status, 
process personality, behavior and relationships,’”161 non-judicial review theorists focus 
on judges as people seizing power from elected leaders illegitimately, rather than 
focusing on the function of judicial review as a legitimate strategy for sustaining 
democracy by coordinating public checks against political branch action.  Their mis-
focus seeks to ensnare the debate over judicial review in a confusing circular argument:  
“legitimacy enables courts to act in a counter-majoritarian fashion, yet counter-
majoritarian behavior threatens the legitimacy of courts.”162  When asked whether 
judicial review is counter-majoritarian, Chief Justice Weisberger stated:  
Judicial review is not designed to be counter-majoritarian, unless it has to 
be.  The court is not desirous of acting in a counter-majoritarian way 
unless the majority has impinged upon fundamental rights or has created a 
suspect classification.163 
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Here, the Chief Justice emphasizes judicial review is a function that acts and moves 
where the situation requires.  In other words, it is a process of leading in a democracy 
where the political branches or even the court itself has impinged upon fundamental 
rights.  Like the Chief Justice, theorist Law, in analyzing judicial review, steers attention 
away from arguing over whether judges are replacing elected leaders and grounds the 
discussion in judicial review as a process of leading in a democracy.  He champions 
judicial review as a strategic function for coordinating public participation in the political 
spaces judges operate.  Law’s analysis of judicial review as a process is akin to Pye’s 
analysis of leading as “enacting, organizing, explaining, managing, and shaping 
collective movement/action/ing.”164  Law’s entreaty resembles Pye’s advocacy for 
advancing research beyond the topic of leadership and leaders to leading.165  Law pushes 
for a post-counter-majoritarianism discussion166 that frees the debate over judicial review 
from circular trappings, and charts the way for a post-counter-majoritarian discussion, 
which for purposes of this thesis, advances a public discourse about how judicial review 
performed by an independent judiciary is relevant and material to democracy’s quest to 
reduce terrorism to ensue. 
2. Post Counter-majoritarianism 
Judicial review serves the strategic function of galvanizing and 
coordinating public participation in the political spaces judges operate.  
Judicial review is relevant and material to democracy’s quest to reduce 
terrorism because it provides a conduit to seek redress of legitimate 
grievances through nonviolent means. 
 
• Judicial review serves a vitally important strategic function for 
coordinating peaceable public participation in a democracy.   
Under Law’s essay, the exercise of judicial review permits judges to gather 
reliable information at the behest of and on behalf of the public, to develop raw data from 
executive and legislative activities that form the basis of their alleged misconduct, and to 
use professional expertise that members of the general public are unlikely to possess to 
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analyze executive and legislation activities for constitutional consistency,167 and where 
necessary, to void legislative and/or executive action where it fails to pass constitutional 
muster.   
When asked whether judicial review serves a strategic function that invites public 
participation in the political spaces judges operate, Chief Justice Weisberger responded,  
Yes.  Limits upon our constitutional actions cannot be discerned from 
random activities of millions of citizens who have not seriously considered 
the question of constitutional application.  I think that it requires an 
organized professional oversight . . . . [However,] The activities of 
individuals in our society create a context in which judicial review takes 
place.  In other words, the current of ideas has an influence without 
question upon judicial decisions . . . . [W]e have to recognize that under 
the law the court cannot go out and simply decide cases or questions in the 
abstract.  They must await litigation to be brought by a party an individual 
or a group of individuals.  They bring a question before the court for 
determination.  The court just cannot reach out and decide issues unless 
people bring cases or controversies before them for adjudication and it 
goes up through the system.  It starts out in a state or federal court and 
gradually winds its way up to the United States Supreme Court.  But it is 
an individual who starts the process. If we take the outstanding case of 
Brown v Board of Education these were individual parents of no particular 
wealth prominence or political power they just brought a lawsuit. . . .  The 
judiciary provides an alternative to violent resolution of disputes--that 
isn’t just the Supreme Court of the United States, but the very function of 
the judiciary within our states, cities and towns across the nation it 
provides a peaceful resolution of disputes . . . . [J]udicial review serves as 
a traffic control type of operation.168 
• So what “traffic” signals do the Supremes send as a point of convergence 
for potential public action against the government?   
The Supremes signal, with eighty-two percent agreeing, that security measures 
must increase as the terror threat increases.  Forty-six percent signal that considering 
whether sufficient time has passed to determine if public safety and security measures 
have served to reduce the terror threat is essential when balancing the interests with 
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twenty-seven percent disagreeing and twenty-seven percent signaling neutrality.  Sixty-
four percent signal that liberty should not and must not yield to security, with twenty-
seven percent of the viewpoint that liberty should or must yield to security, and eighteen 
percent signaling neutrality either way.   
In sum, the public can take from this that a key factor to consider during national 
emergencies when balancing competing interests is whether the government has 
implemented security measures less harmful to constitutionally protected liberty interests, 
ninety-one percent of the Supremes share this view with nine percent signaling neutrality.   
Moving along, eighty-two percent of the Supremes signal that modern terrorism, 
9/11 terror attacks, has expanded the conventional definition of war.  Even so, there is no 
consensus for modifying constitutions, by say, granting extra-constitutional authority to 
the political branches during national emergencies.  Fifty-five percent of the Supremes 
signal that such expansion does not call for modifying Constitutions, the integrity of 
which eighty-two percent deem paramount. While twenty-seven percent signal modifying 
constitutions is required and eighteen percent signal neutrality on the issue of constitution 
modification and primacy.   
• What are the Supremes’ thoughts on modifying ordinary processes of 
criminal law and procedure during the GWOT?   
The data reveals that modern terrorism requires modification, with fifty-five 
percent agreeing and forty-five percent disagreeing.  Chief Justice Weisberger opines 
that, “Miranda limitations might have to be somewhat diminished” in response to modern 
terrorism irrespective of the effect on prosecutions where avoiding catastrophe and 
remediating resulting disaster is the ultimate goal.  However, he cautions against using 
modern terrorism as a pretext for modifying laws to permit racial and ethnic profiling as a 
basis for imprisonment or detention:   
The obligation of government is to prove there is a reason for detention 
and to do it not because of racial profiling, ethnic profiling, or overriding 
belief that anyone that might be termed a Muslim is an infiltrator.  You 





leads a law enforcement authority to investigate.  But, it is not and never 
should be a reason for imprisonment or detention . . . . Punishment based 
on race or ethnicity is absolutely unacceptable.169 
Of note, the data reveals forty-five percent of the Supremes signal that racial or 
ethnic profiling is not required even as a matter of policy, while thirty-seven percent 
signal it is permissible and eighteen percent are neutral.  The data here may be of special 
interest to members of the Muslim and Arab community, progressive socially conscious 
lawyers and psychologists.  Post 9/11, the horrific actions of 19 murderous terrorists 
amazingly, “were generalized to an impression of millions,” of Americans who embraced 
the notion some consciously other unconsciously that the actions of the 19 were 
representative of the larger Muslim and Arab populations.170  
The Chief Justice speaking of the challenges associated with psychological effects 
of terrorism cautions against panic and urges against creating a culture of security that 
impinges on the liberty of someone else:   
Security and self-preservation are closely related and very few human 
beings wish to give up security they also value their liberties and they 
want to retain them sometimes they forget about the liberty of somebody 
else who is, in their opinion, threatening their security.  Therefore, they are 
willing to compromise the liberty of some body else, they consider to be a 
danger to them without realizing that when they take away the liberty of 
someone else they are endangering their own liberty.  We cannot say that 
the liberties of someone else are irrelevant to us because they are all 
relevant.  Sometimes we may forget.  As when we imprisoned thousands 
of Japanese, the attorney general of the state of California at that time was 
Earl Warren who later became one of the greatest of all civil libertarians.  
At that time, he was not opposed to imprisoning the Japanese, because he 
regarded them as a threat and we were in a panic following the attack of 
December 7, 1941.171 
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Similarly, in warning against panic, Ickenberry and Mayer172 posits that panic 
drove the Bush administration to, for the first time in history, routinely sanction, 
“government officials to physically and psychologically torment U.S.-held captives, 
making torture the official law of the land in all but name.”  It is panic-inspired 
governmental policies, programs, and laws, which impinge upon the liberty of someone 
else that an independent judiciary exercising judicial review, can guard against; for 
example, permitting torture routinely, and permitting indefinite detention of non-U.S. 
citizens suspected of terrorism without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.   
• The Supremes signal there is limited value in permitting indefinite 
detention of non-U.S. citizens suspected of terrorism without requiring 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Fifty-five percent disagree there is value while forty-five agree there is value.  
Significantly, fifty-five percent agree there is value in permitting indefinite detention of 
non-U.S. citizens so long as there is a persuasive showing before a judge in an adversary 
hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist while thirty-six percent disagree and nine 
percent are neutral.  With respect to detaining U.S. citizens indefinitely without requiring 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, sixty-three percent signal that there is no value and 
only twenty-seven percent signal that there is value.  Whereas on the issue of whether 
there is value in indefinitely detaining U.S. citizens so long as there is a persuasive 
showing before an adversary hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist, the findings are 
statistically insignificant:  forty-six percent of the Supremes agree and forty-five percent 
disagree, and nine percent signal neutrality.   
What then is the clear signal?  Although the standard of proof may differ, 
reasonable doubt versus persuasive showing, there is value in providing due process173 
for citizens and non-citizens alike where indefinite detention is at issue.   
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• What about conferring substantive constitutional rights174 on known or 
suspected terrorists?  
The data shows that whether there is value in conferring constitutional rights on 
known terrorists is statistically insignificant:  one percent.  Forty-six percent agree there is 
value, forty-five percent disagree, and nine percent are neutral.  However, the Supremes 
signal there is value in conferring constitutional rights on known terrorists only if they are 
citizens of the U.S. Fifty-five percent agree, thirty-six percent disagree, and nine percent 
signal neutrality.  Further, eighty-two percent disagree that there is value in conferring 
constitutional rights on known terrorists only to protect the innocent, with nine percent 
agreeing there is and nine percent are neutral.   
In short, those Supremes who find value in conferring constitutional rights on 
known terrorists, forty-six percent, would not limit constitutional application to known 
terrorists only where protecting the innocent was the case, adding to but disagreeing with 
the views of those Supremes who would find no value (forty-five percent) in conferring 
constitutional rights on known terrorists, at all. 
Conversely, the Supremes signal there is value in conferring constitutional rights 
on suspected terrorists, sixty-four percent agree, twenty-seven percent disagree, and nine 
percent are neutral.  While fifty-five percent agree there is value in conferring 
constitutional rights only for suspected terrorists who are citizens of the U.S., thirty-six 
percent disagree and nine percent are neutral.  Here, nine percent of the fifty-five percent 
of Supremes who agreed there is value in conferring constitutional rights on suspected 
terrorists, strongly disagreed there is no value in conferring constitutional rights on non-
U.S. citizens, adding to but disagreeing with the views of those Supremes who would 
find no value (twenty-seven percent) in conferring constitutional rights on suspected 
terrorists, at all.  In addition, seventy-three percent disagree there is value in conferring 
constitutional rights on suspected terrorists only to protect the innocent, whereas 
eighteen-percent agree there is value and nine percent are neutral.  Lastly, the nine 
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percent who found value for suspected terrorists only to protect the innocent, found no 
value in conferring constitutional rights on known terrorists only to protect the innocent. 
What clear signal does the data reveal?  There is value in conferring constitutional 
rights on suspected terrorists regardless of protecting the innocent and regardless of 
citizenship.  That said, and interestingly, the Supremes signal that gathering intelligence 
using clandestine surveillance to secure America is permissible.  Eighty-two percent 
agree that a response to the 9/11 attacks can require clandestine surveillance of U.S. 
citizens but only as a matter of law, with nine-percent disagreeing and nine-percent 
neutral; while eighty-two percent agree that clandestine surveillance of non-U.S. citizens 
is permissible as a matter of policy, and eighteen percent disagree. 
What is more, on the issue of constitutional rights and coercive interrogation, the 
data reveals that coercive interrogation techniques constitutes punishment with fifty-four 
percent of the Supremes disagreeing that it does not constitute punishment.  Thirty-seven 
percent of the Supremes signal the techniques do not constitute punishment, and nine 
percent signal neutrality.  The data also shows that coercive interrogation techniques 
constitute punishment, even when no other method would work quickly enough to be 
effective with forty-five percent of the Supremes disagreeing that it does not constitute 
punishment, twenty-seven agreeing that it does and twenty-seven signaling neutrality.  
Even so, forty-six percent signal that there is value in permitting coercive techniques, but 
only when the value of the information sought is great, thirty-six percent disagree and 
eighteen percent signal neutrality. 
When asked “what is your understanding of coercive interrogation techniques” 
and about the need to gather intelligence from foreign and domestic sources, the Chief 
Justice responded: 
Well, I suppose that to define it, one would say that a coercive 
interrogation technique would be a technique, which is designed to obtain 
information through the use of force or the threat of force, or torture or the 
threat of torture.  And that it is a form of interrogation that has been 
widely used throughout the history of mankind, but which has generally 
been discouraged in the United States since 1966, since the Miranda 
decision . . . . There is a difference between using coercive techniques to 
avoid catastrophic disaster and attempting to build a case for prosecution 
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under the criminal law . . . if we are dealing with attempts to avoid 
catastrophic disaster we may have to relax some of the limitations on law 
enforcement personnel for survival . . . . respond[ing] to threats to national 
security intelligence is a vital element, we cannot defend ourselves 
without intelligence whether it is against a foreign threat or a domestic 
threat, if we are unable to gather intelligence we are in a sense fighting 
blindly and fighting blindly is equivalent perhaps to not fighting at all.  
Therefore, the gathering of intelligence both foreign and domestic is 
essential to the security of the nation.  The methods of gathering that 
intelligence are of course subject to some restraint, including the Fourth 
and Fifth amendments, but consistent with those restraints I would think it 
appropriate for both the national government and state police 
organizations to gather all the intelligence that they possibly can in a legal 
manner that would tend to protect the state and the nation against violent 
terrorism and illegal actions . . . We must protect ourselves.  We must 
preserve ourselves.  But, in doing so we must go no further than the 
catastrophe requires.  We cannot use [coercive interrogation] techniques 
capaciously, arbitrarily but only when they are absolutely necessary to our 
survival.  The fact that we were champions of individual liberty, 
individual freedom and that we extended those freedoms to even aliens in 
our midst and to aliens who came under our control…now of course from 
time to time we deviated from that high moral status when we imprisoned 
the Japanese during World War II, thousands of Japanese were imprisoned 
without any basis other than ethnic or racial origin.  We departed from 
those principles, certainly recently detaining people without proving that 
they are enemy combatants and where we do not have reasonable or 
probable cause to believe that they are enemy combatants.175   
What clear signal does the data reveal? Preventing imminent catastrophe that 
threatens America’s survival can justify use of coercive interrogation, but that does not 
necessarily mean its use is not cruel and unusual punishment.  As importantly, 
indefinitely detaining human beings and routinely subjecting them to coercive 
interrogation techniques during a perpetual GWOT violates constitutionality protected 
liberty interests.   
• Why should the public focus on the Supremes’ signals concerning 
coercive interrogation and indefinite detention?   
Eighty-two percent of the Supremes signal that modern terrorism may require 
they have an increased role in protecting liberties against government encroachment, and 
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sixty-four percent agree intelligence information sharing among federal, state, local and 
tribal governments may increase the state judiciary’s role in foreign and domestic 
security efforts.   
Moreover, when asked to identify the most important factors necessary to 
consider when determining whether to grant a habeas petition of a suspected terrorist 
detainee, eight percent of the Supremes signaled that all factors provided in question 30 
were the most important.  That said, the Supremes identified citizenship as number one 
with twelve percent of the Supremes agreeing it was the most important factor to 
consider.  Length of detainment, nationality, prisoner of war status, and whether the U.S. 
is engaged in a congressionally declared or authorized war all tied for second, with 
eleven percent agreeing these factors were most important to consider.  Whether capture 
came about because of intelligence information sharing among federal, state, local and 
tribal governments came in third, with nine percent agreeing.  Lastly, place of detainment 
and place of arrest came in fourth, with eight percent agreeing these factors were the most 
important. 
Notwithstanding, the omnipresence of the Bush doctrine, ninety-one percent of 
the Supremes signal that unilateral action, by either political branch, authorizing public 
safety and security measures during the GWOT, violates constitutional principles of 
separation of powers.  In addition, importantly, seventy-three percent signal that 
America’s global image is a key factor to consider when weighing the competing 
interests, with eighteen percent disagreeing and nine percent signaling neutrality.   
When asked, is there a connection between preserving the integrity of America’s 
Constitution and improving the image of America globally, and what message America 
should impart to the world during the GWOT, the Chief Justices replied,  
America has been described as a beacon on the hill just as the statute of 
liberty has been the emblem of a free state and a refuge from tyranny so, 
indeed, is our nations of laws and liberties a model for the world.  It has 
been a model since its founding.  Now, I cannot say that all people in all 
nations will love America because of its freedom and because of its 
idealism that has always been perhaps a dream that has never achieved full 
accomplishment.  I think we were despised by imperial Japan.  I think we 
were despised by the regime of Adolph Hilter.  I think tyrants despised us 
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throughout our history.  However most people and in most nations 
throughout the world respected America for her ideals and the purity of 
her motives.  I believe that this characterization is part of our reputation 
part of our reason for being and is basic to our reputation throughout the 
world . . . . However devoted we are to our constitutional system of a 
republican government we must realize, of course that all peoples in all 
times do not necessarily agree with the principles of democracy or the 
principles that are embodied in our constitutional form of government.  
There have been and are nations who are ruled under monarchial 
principles or who are devoted to a system of government that for example 
may have a very strong mixture of religious dominance as opposed to 
separation of church and state.  There are countries in which a religious 
influence is expected, taken for granted and highly prized.  I will give you 
one historical example in our own country.  Roger Williams was disdained 
by Massachusetts and Connecticut because he espoused religious 
tolerance.  Massachusetts and Connecticut did not.  The puritanical 
government in those two colonies absolutely considered tolerance to be a 
vice rather than a virtue.  Now, there are some countries in the world today 
some of them devoted to Islamic law where a democracy such as ours 
would not be considered desirable, but government by clerics would be 
considered the ideal form of government.  We have to respect those 
differences.176 
The Chief Justice’s America is a contextualized democracy.  It respects human 
dignity, which as Power, West, Moghaddam, and Brzezinski offer, is essential to a 
sovereign’s legitimacy and a publics’ freedom.  What is the signal?  If promoted with 
care, America’s contextualized democracy is a model for combating the anti-American 
global political awakening and leading occupants on the ground floor of the staircase to 
terrorism off.   
3. Legitimacy 
Judicial review serves to enhance the legitimacy of a state and to promote 
a contextualized democracy by upholding the rule of law, individual rights 
and freedoms with transparency.  Judicial review is material and relevant 
to democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism because it is a stabilizing force 
against tyranny.  
Judicial review performed by an independent judiciary serves to promote a 
contextualized democracy, enhance a sovereign’s legitimacy and reduce terrorism.  
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Moghaddam observed that a contributing factor to terrorism is the exportation of a 
Western democracy that fails to speak to the “personal and collective identities and 
situations” of persons “on the ground floor of the staircase to terrorism.”177  West on 
America’s history argued that the imposition of a de-contextualized democracy led to 
terrorism and war.  Young America established a democracy that denied the human 
dignity of African Americans with “[t]wo hundred and forty-four years of slavery and 
nearly a century of institutionalized terrorism in the form of segregation, lynchings, and 
second-class citizenship in America.”178  In failing to match its deeds to its values,179 
America’s democracy was illegitimate the result was war: 
America denies its night side until it breaks right through.  There’s no 
direct reference to slavery in the original U.S. Constitution.  That’s not 
just a slight gesture.  That’s lying.  You can’t get away with that.  You end 
up fighting a civil war over an institution not invoked in the Constitution.  
That’s a level of denial that’s incredibly deep.  You think you’re innocent, 
yet you’ve created the catastrophe right in your midst.  You try to sanitize 
and sterilize it so expertly that you think the funk is not going to hunt you 
down.  But it never works.180 
Similarly, the Bush doctrine,181 however well-intended, created a catastrophic 
funk that smells globally, and will take years to clean up.182  Fortunately, the clean up 
appears on the horizon under the leadership and vision of President Barack Obama.183  
Also, just as judicial review played a key role in eliminating the stench of America’s 
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terrorism against blacks; it is at the ready to uphold the rule of law, acknowledging rights 
(even of America’s suspected enemies)184 to protect individual freedom of the 
dichotomous self/other and to foster a more perfect Union.  Chief Justice Weisberger 
reminds us how judicial review promoted and preserved human dignity and that where it 
was lacking murderous chaos ensued:   
If it had not been for judicial review equal rights would not have been 
given in the old states of the confederacy to African Americans in regard 
to education voting and other basic rights of citizenship . . . .  
The Reichstag was not subject to any judicial review.  Whatever the 
Reichstag voted was the law of Germany and you know what the 
Reichstag did.  It established a dictatorship that was; I suppose you might 
say, was one of the horrible examples of tyranny, terrorism, and 
despotism.185 
Clearly, then judicial review is an inherent part of and inextricably linked to the 
success of the American democratic experiment; put another way, judicial review has 
served a legitimating function in America’s democracy.  By ensuring that government 
deeds are matched to human dignity, judicial review guards against tyranny and 
demonstrates its materiality (pertinence and necessity) and relevancy (germaneness) to 
democracy’s quest to reduce terrorism because it offers an alternative process for an 
aggrieved public, who might otherwise take up the sword against their government, to 
peaceably petition their government for redress.   
Researchers who authored “More Freedom, Less Terror” show how “legitimacy 
brought about through liberalization measures,” measures permitting persons to 
participate legally in the political process,186 “can have a positive effect on reducing 
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support for political violence”, on terrorism in regions where terrorists originate.187  Also, 
importantly, how judicial oversight, judicial review, performed by an independent 
judiciary, guards against tyranny and promotes government legitimacy, the publics’ belief 
in the system’s ability to uphold the rule of law, to address concerns, to redress 
grievances over human rights, freedom of the press, speech and other liberties.188  They 
warn, however, that “eroding legitimacy” by instituting cosmetic reforms and 
backtracking on political reforms designed to provide political access and protect 
individual freedoms, in regions where terrorists originate, raises the potential for 
increased violent extremism.189  Correspondingly, scholars warn that America’s global 
legitimacy has been eroded in part as a result of the Bush Doctrine, “lauding reform 
solely on the basis of elections”190 and with legislative branch support, constraining 
judicial review of security measures implemented in the name of the GWOT,191 chief 
among them denial of habeas corpus.192  There is a call for more research on “how 
precisely lack of legitimacy and anti-Americanism have hurt U.S. diplomacy and how 
rectifying past mistakes in these matters would produce more good than harm.”193 
Similarly, although this thesis advocates for a public discourse that transcends the 
debate over whether judicial review is democratically illegitimate, it suggests there is a 
relationship between the argument espoused by non-judicial review theorists that judicial 
                                                 
187 Ibid., Regions researched included: Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco. 
188 Ibid., 167-171, 174-175; Law, in “A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review,” explaining 
that “courts can coordinate popular action against usurping governments by generating common beliefs and 
common knowledge about both the constitutionality of government conduct and the ways in which other 
citizens will react,” 10. 
189 Kaye et al., “More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab 
World,” “the lack of legitimacy stemming from undeveloped [liberalization] measures and associated rights 
or, [] the reversal of even limited gains, increases the appeal of extremist groups,” 167-171, 174-175. 
190 Ibid., 174-175; Moghaddam’s discussion of free and fair elections that elect despots and tyrants, 
Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What they Experience and Why they Come to Destroy, 
129-130, 132-135. 
191 Leffler and Legro, Dilemmas of Strategy,” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush 
Doctrine, 141, 262-270. 
192 Power, “Legitimacy and Competence” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush 
Doctrine, 141. 
193 Leffler and Legro, Dilemmas of Strategy,” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush 
Doctrine, 274. 
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review is democratically illegitimate, the Bush Doctrine and the anti-American global 
political awakening, which can harm U.S. efforts to promote a contextualized democracy.  
Democracy, which research suggests, “pressing ahead with genuine democratization, not 
just limited reforms, may stem extremism over time by bolstering the legitimacy of weak 
and vulnerable regimes” in regions where terrorist originate.194   
What is needed, then, is more research not on whether judicial review is 
democratically illegitimate, but rather whether the argument that it is, fueled the Bush 
Doctrine, which in turn, eroded U.S. legitimacy and fed anti-American sentiment inherent 
in the global political awakening’s195 lust for terrorism.  Understanding whether and how 
the argument damaged the legitimizing effects of judicial review to the detriment of 
democracy promotion and counterterrorism strategies, would further advance a post-
counter-majoritarian discussion about judicial review’s materiality and relevancy to 
democracy’s quest to reduce terror. 
                                                 
194 Kaye et al., “More Freedom, Less Terror? Liberalization and Political Violence in the Arab 
World,” 172-174. 
195 This anti-American global politically awakening is arguably reflected in the waning of foreign 
reliance on rulings of American justices. Adam Lipstack, “U.S. Court Is Now Guiding Fewer Nations,” 
New York Times, September 18, 2008. 
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APPENDIX.  SURVEY BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS OF 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC SAFETY/SECURITY MEASURES 
IN TIMES OF NATIONAL EMERGENCIES 
For purposes of the below survey, national emergency means the global war on 
terror sparked by the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.  Civil liberties refer to the 
protections afforded by the federal and state Constitutions designed to maintain freedom 
from coercive governmental actions.  Public safety/security measures are governmental 
acts designed to secure the United States against real and/or imagined threats to the 
Nation. 
 
I am of the view that:  
 
1. The integrity of the Constitution (federal and/or state) is paramount when 
weighing the competing interests of civil liberties and public safety/security 
measures during times of national emergencies 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
2. An essential element to consider when balancing the competing interests of civil 
liberties and public safety/security measures during times of national emergencies 
is whether alternative less harmful (to liberty) public safety/security measures 
may be implemented 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
3. An essential element to consider when balancing the competing interests of civil 
liberties and public safety security measures during times of national emergencies 
is whether sufficient time has passed to determine whether the public 
safety/security measure has served to reduce the terror threat 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
4. During times of national emergencies, civil liberties should yield in favor of 
public safety/security measures 





5. During times of national emergencies, civil liberties must yield in favor of public 
safety/security measures 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
6. It is essential that Congress and the Executive Branch act in concert in authorizing 
public/safety security measures during times of national emergencies 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
7. America’s image globally is a key factor to consider when weighing the 
competing interests of civil liberties and public safety/security measures during 
times of national emergencies 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
8. Public safety/security measures must increase as the terror threat increases 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
9. There is value in conferring constitutional rights on known terrorists 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
10. There is value in conferring constitutional rights on known terrorists only if they 
are citizens of the United States 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
11. There is value in conferring constitutional rights on suspected terrorists 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
12. There is value in conferring constitutional rights on suspected terrorists only if 
they are citizens of the United States 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
13. There is value in conferring constitutional rights on suspected terrorists only to 
protect the innocent  





14. There is value in conferring constitutional rights on known terrorists only to 
protect the innocent  
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
15. There is value in permitting indefinite detention of U.S. citizens suspected of 
terrorism without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect 
really is a terrorist 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
16. There is value in permitting indefinite detention of U.S. citizens suspected of 
terrorism so long as there is a persuasive showing before a judge in an adversary 
hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist   
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
17. There is value in permitting indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens suspected of 
terrorism so long as there is a persuasive showing before a judge in an adversary 
hearing that the suspect really is a terrorist   
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
18. There is value in permitting indefinite detention of non-U.S. citizens suspected of 
terrorism without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect 
really is a terrorist 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
19. Modern terrorism--the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, expanded the 
conventional definition of war 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
20. Modern terrorism--the September 11, 2001, terror attacks requires the 
modification of the ordinary processes of criminal law and procedure 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
21. Modern terrorism--the September 11, 2001, terror attacks requires the 
modification of the ordinary processes of Constitutional law 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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22. A response to modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001, terror attacks requires 
as a matter of policy racial and/or ethnic profiling 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
23. Coercive interrogation techniques do not constitute punishment during times of 
national emergencies 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
24. There is value in permitting coercive interrogation techniques during times of 
national emergencies only when the value of information sought is great 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
25. Coercive interrogation techniques during times of national emergencies do not 
constitute punishment only when no other method would work quickly enough to 
be effective 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
26. A response to modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001 terror attacks can 
require as a matter of policy clandestine surveillance of non-U.S. citizens  
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
27. A response to modern terrorism—the September 11, 2001 terror attacks can 
require clandestine surveillance of U.S. citizens only as a matter of law 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
28. Modern terrorism may require the States’ judiciary as  “independent tribunals of 
justice” to serve an increased role against the “assumption of power in the 
legislative or executive branch. . . to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated in the constitution by the declaration of rights” 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
 
29. The State’s judiciary may have a critical role in national security measures or 
more precisely homeland defense and security because the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing of 2007 strongly encourages federal, state, local and tribal 
governments to share intelligence information relating to terrorist activity 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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30. Please check the most important factor(s) that you believe are necessary to 
consider when determining whether to grant a habeas petition of a suspected 
terrorist detainee during times of national emergency.   
 
___  Citizenship 
___  Place of detainment 
___  Length of detainment 
___  Nationality 
___  Place of arrest 
___  Prisoner of War status 
___  Whether the U.S. is engaged in a congressionally authorized war 
___  Whether the U.S. is engaged in a congressionally declared war 
___  Whether capture was pursuant to intelligence information sharing among federal, 
state, local or tribal governments 
___  All of the above 
___  Other please explain: 
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